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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is comprised of two essays that examine the causes and 
consequences of shareholder activism. In the first essay, we examine five different types 
of evidence to determine whether interventions by activist investors increase shareholder 
value. We find short-window returns around the announcement of an activist share 
purchase are sizable and do not reverse in a two-year, post-intervention period. The 
increase is greatest for demands to sell all, or part, of the target firm but is still 
significant for other demands. Many critics of activism maintain the market is being 
misled. We therefore investigate how market participants who invest heavily in 
information respond, since they are likely to be knowledgeable about the long-term 
impact of activism. Despite an often sizable price increase around the activist 
announcement, analyst buy recommendations increase, short interest declines, and 
accounting fundamentals improve. Most importantly, ownership by long-term 
(“dedicated”) institutional investors increases. All five types of evidence indicate that 
activist interventions increase long-term shareholder value.  
In the second essay, I examine how business press coverage influences 
shareholder activists’ targeting decisions and subsequent campaign announcements. 
Leveraging predictions from prior theory, I posit and find that activists are most likely to 
target firms with high levels of total media coverage, especially negative media 
coverage. I also argue that activists may target firms with high media coverage to 
increase the likelihood that their campaign receives media coverage. I find consistent 
 iii 
 
evidence that pre-intervention press coverage is positively related to the likelihood and 
the level of press coverage of an activist campaign announcement. Finally, I find 
evidence of one benefit that higher media coverage conveys to activists who are 
successful in gaining coverage of their campaign announcements, namely, higher 
announcement returns. Together, these findings shed light on important determinants 
and consequences to shareholder interventions. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation is comprised of two essays that examine the causes and 
consequences of shareholder activism. In the first essay, we examine five different types 
of evidence to determine whether interventions by activist investors increase shareholder 
value. We find short-window returns around the announcement of an activist share 
purchase are sizable and do not reverse in a two-year, post-intervention period. The 
increase is greatest for demands to sell all, or part, of the target firm but is still 
significant for other demands. Many critics of activism maintain the market is being 
misled. We therefore investigate how market participants who invest heavily in 
information respond, since they are likely to be knowledgeable about the long-term 
impact of activism. Despite an often sizable price increase around the activist 
announcement, analyst buy recommendations increase, short interest declines, and 
accounting fundamentals improve. Most importantly, ownership by long-term 
(“dedicated”) institutional investors increases. All five types of evidence indicate that 
activist interventions increase long-term shareholder value.  
In the second essay, I examine how business press coverage influences 
shareholder activists’ targeting decisions and subsequent campaign announcements. 
Leveraging predictions from prior theory, I posit and find that activists are most likely to 
target firms with high levels of media coverage, especially negative media coverage. I 
also argue that activists may target firms with high media coverage to increase the 
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likelihood that their campaign receives media coverage. I find consistent evidence that 
pre-intervention press coverage is positively related to the likelihood and the level of 
press coverage of an activist campaign announcement. Finally, I find evidence of one 
benefit that higher media coverage conveys to activists who are successful in gaining 
coverage of their campaign announcements, namely, higher announcement returns. 
Together, these findings shed light on important determinants and consequences to 
shareholder interventions. 
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CHAPTER II  
ARE ACTIVIST INVESTORS GOOD OR BAD FOR BUSINESS?  
EVIDENCE FROM CAPITAL MARKET PRICES,  
INFORMED TRADERS, AND FIRM FUNDAMENTALS 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, activist investors and the companies they target have attracted 
considerable attention—in the press, in the business and legal communities, in the 
political arena, and in academia. The fundamental question under debate is, as a recent 
Wall Street Journal article put it, “Are activist shareholders good or bad for business? 
(Benoit and Monga 2015).” Influential critics allege that “myopic activists” have a short 
investment horizon and seek actions that increase short-term stock prices at the expense 
of long-term shareholder value. We provide evidence to evaluate this criticism.1 We 
begin by examining short-window equity returns around the activist ownership 
announcement and returns over the next two years. We also investigate whether target 
firms’ financial performance improves or declines after the activist intervention. The 
study’s primary innovation, however, is to investigate how highly informed market 
participants respond to activist interventions. We consider three parties who invest 
heavily in information acquisition and interpretation: financial analysts, short sellers, and 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this study, we define an activist investor, or a shareholder activist, as an individual or 
business entity that purchases a sizeable stake in a target company to effect value-increasing changes 
(Klein and Zur 2009). Although activism can impact a variety of stakeholders, (e.g., customers, 
employees, debtholders, to name a few), we focus on the value of activism for shareholders.  
 4 
 
institutional investors. Our analysis of informed trading avoids empirical challenges 
related to the measurement of long-window returns (Kothari and Warner 1997), and it 
responds to critics of activism who do not accept market prices as the arbiter of firm 
value. The response of knowledgeable parties also provides direct evidence on the 
allegation by prominent critic Martin Lipton that a consensus is developing that the 
short-term orientation of activist investors is damaging the economy.2  
We are interested in whether short sellers, financial analysts, and institutional 
owners agree or disagree about the valuation implications of an activist intervention. 
Finding agreement among three different market participants is a high hurdle. We are 
aware of one prior study examining agreement among these market participants. Jiao, 
Massa, and Zhang (2016) measure informed long demand by a decrease in shares sold 
short and an increase in institutional stock holdings by hedge funds; informed short 
demand is the opposite. They find that agreement among informed traders produces 
substantial out-of-sample abnormal returns and predicts future accounting fundamentals 
and analyst recommendation revisions. Their study indicates that agreement among 
sophisticated market participants provides insight into future shareholder value. Our 
study examines this issue in a different setting.  
                                                 
2 Martin Lipton, a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, is the most widely cited critic of 
activism. He states: “After three decades of turbulence in the corporate governance arena, we believe we 
are nearing an inflection point, as an increasing number of investors, stakeholders, academics, advisors, 
politicians and policymakers are recognizing the far-reaching and damaging effects of short-termism. 
Short-termism and activism are significant contributors to diminished GDP and to economic decline.” 
(Lipton 2016). 
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Our analyses are based on a large sample of activist interventions from 1994 to 
2014. Prior studies generally use campaigns in which the activist obtains an equity stake 
greater than 5% (the threshold for filing Schedule 13D with the SEC). Our study 
includes instances where the activist’s ownership position is sizable, yet less than 5%. 
This occurs most often when target firms are very large and interventions arguably have 
the greatest economic impact. For example, Forbes reported that Carl Icahn owned only 
about 1% of Apple stock at the start of his well-publicized intervention, despite having 
an investment of $3 billion (Vardi 2014). Prior research has extensively studied activism 
through 2008, but much less research has been conducted on more recent years. Figure 1 
illustrates the rise in the number of activism campaigns and the increased attention that 
shareholder activism has received in the business press in recent years. Coffee and Palia 
(2016, 6) question the relevance of empirical papers that study hedge fund activism in 
earlier decades. Krishnan, Partnoy, and Thomas (2016) refer to the period after 2008 as 
the “second wave” of activism because new activists enter, competition increases, and 
the most viable opportunities for interventions decline. Consistent with an increase in 
competition in recent years, a Wall Street Journal study of the biggest 71 campaigns 
from 2009 through 2014 found that activist-targeted companies outperformed peers in 
total shareholder return only about 50% of the time (Benoit 2016).  
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Figure 1. Activist Campaigns in Thomson One and Number of Activism Articles in 
Dow Jones News Sources, 2000 – 2015 
 
The figure plots the number of activism campaigns in Thomson One (left axis) and the number of 
activism-related news articles for all Dow Jones news sources (right axis) for the years 2000 to 2015.  
Activism-related articles are identified in Factiva using the following search (without quotes): “hedge fund 
activis* or shareholder activis* or investor activis* or activist invest*”. 
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Our study begins by reexamining results from prior research that show a positive 
short-window market reaction to the announcement of an activist campaign. Despite the 
sample differences, our results are consistent with prior research in finding that targets 
experience positive, short-window abnormal returns that are statistically and 
economically significant. The returns average 4.63% over a 16-day window and are 
especially large—averaging almost 17%—when managers are pushed by activists to sell 
all or part of the company (consistent with results from Greenwood and Schor 2009, and 
Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani 2016). We find the average return is 3.48% for non-
sale interventions, which is still sizable for a 16-day period (almost 50% annualized). 
This last result, which differs from Greenwood and Schor 2009, is notable because it 
broadens the set of interventions that increase the value of target companies beyond the 
sale of all or part of the company.  
Next, we examine how financial analysts and short sellers respond to the 
ownership announcement. Analysts are generally regarded as the most important 
information intermediary for equity investors. Nevertheless, research indicates that short 
interest provides information that complements, and often exceeds, the information in 
analyst recommendations (Drake, Rees, and Swanson 2011). In investigating the 
reactions of informed parties, we compare target-firm outcomes to those of a propensity-
score matched sample of control firms with similar pre-intervention characteristics. We 
conduct this analysis for the two years before and after the activist announcement, 
although we are primarily interested in the post-announcement period.  
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If, as its critics contend, activism actually destroys shareholder value, then target 
firms with positive abnormal returns in the announcement period would be overvalued. 
In this case, one might expect short selling to increase and analyst recommendations to 
be less positive after the announcement. We find the opposite. Specifically, we find that 
analyst recommendations for target firms decline (become less favorable) leading up to 
the activist announcement. The decline is sharp during the last six months prior to the 
announcement and quite different from the control firms. After the intervention, the 
average recommendation stabilizes for a few months (as analysts digest the implications 
of the intervention) and then becomes more favorable for the remainder of the two-year, 
post-intervention period. Examining short selling, average short interest for the targets is 
initially below that for the control firms, but it increases sharply so that it is slightly 
higher by the activism announcement. Short interest for the target firms then declines 
sharply after the announcement and finishes well below the control firms at the end of 
the 24-month post-announcement period. Two points are noteworthy: First, financial 
analysts and short sellers respond as if the increase in stock price at the activist 
intervention represents real value creation, rather than market overvaluation. Second, 
neither short sellers nor analysts anticipate an improvement in target firm performance. 
Some critics argue that activists are simply good stock pickers who are able to target 
companies that would improve their performance even without an intervention. If so, 
activists must have information that financial analysts and short sellers do not possess.  
Next, we investigate whether returns and the reactions of analysts and short 
sellers are supported by improvements in the target company’s financial results. We use 
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Piotroski’s (2000) FScore, a broad, composite measure based on financial statement 
analysis that combines nine financial statement fundamentals. FScores have received 
considerable acceptance by investors and are available on several websites.3 We find that 
two years prior to the activism announcement, target firms and their matched control 
counterparts have statistically equivalent FScores. The financial health of target firms 
then deteriorates, and in the year of the activism announcement, target firms have lower 
FScores. After the activist intervention, firm performance improves to the extent that 
activist targets have higher FScores by the second year.  
Because critics often allege that shareholder activism induces short-termism at 
target firms, our final analysis examines whether an activist intervention affects the 
composition of a target firm’s investor base. The intuition for this test is straightforward: 
If shareholder activism causes managers to adopt policies that favor short-term 
performance at the expense of long-term value creation, institutional investors with a 
long-term investment horizon would be expected to decrease their ownership. Using the 
classification of institutional investors developed by Bushee (1998), we find that 
ownership by “dedicated” (long-term) institutional investors does not decrease and, in 
fact, increases following an activist intervention. This occurs for both sale and non-sale 
campaigns, with an ownership increase for sale campaigns of about 69% (above the pre-
intervention level). As with analyst recommendations and short selling, the favorable 
                                                 
3 Updated FScores are reported on grahaminvestor.com, stockrover.com, and aaii.com (American 
Association of Individual Investors). AAII.com has built the FScore into its “AAII Stock Investor Pro” 
screening software, which is discussed in a Forbes article: http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/23/piotroski-
investors-strategy-personal-finance_piotroski.html. 
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reaction by “dedicated” institutional investors occurs after the stock price has increased 
at the public announcement for most targets.  
Our study contributes to the literature on shareholder activism by considering 
several types of evidence to investigate the fundamental question of whether activist 
shareholders are good or bad for business. We acknowledge that it is possible to develop 
alternative explanations for the patterns we observe in analyst recommendations and 
short selling. For example, analysts may be especially interested in obtaining 
information from corporate managers when the company is under pressure from activists 
to change its operations. Providing a favorable buy recommendation might increase an 
analyst’s access to managers. Short sellers could be forced to reduce their position 
because share purchases by activists have caused a recall of shares on loan and/or 
increased borrowing costs. Of the five types of evidence, the increase in ownership by 
long-horizon (dedicated) institutional investors is the most difficult to explain if activism 
induces managerial short-termism. The substantial post-intervention change in FScore is 
also indicative of improved performance by targeted companies. The one shared 
explanation for each of the five types of evidence is that inventions by activist investors 
are beneficial for shareholders.  
Background on Investor Activism 
Shareholder activism is a response to the potential increase in firm value from 
addressing the agency conflict at the core of large publicly traded companies with 
absentee owners (Gillan and Starks 2007, 58). Until the 1980s, the realm of shareholder 
activism was largely dominated by large institutional investors—insurance companies, 
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banks, pension funds and retirement funds—and a relatively small group of corporate 
raiders (Holderness and Sheehan 1985; Gillan and Starks 2000, 2007; Brav, Jiang, and 
Hyunseob 2010). Over the past two decades, however, hedge funds have played an 
increasingly prominent role as activist investors.4  
The changes sought by activists can be broadly categorized as relating to the 
target’s operations, capital structure, or corporate governance.5 Commonly observed 
operational goals include selling a division of the company, improving the target’s 
operational efficiency, restructuring the business, or even selling the company itself. 
Interventions related to capital structure often seek to increase the level of debt and/or 
reduce excess cash through higher dividend payments or stock buybacks. Corporate 
governance changes may include gaining representation on the board of directors; 
eliminating various takeover defenses, such as poison pills and board classification; 
replacing management; or increasing corporate transparency (Gillan and Starks 2007). 
These classifications are not mutually exclusive.  
                                                 
4 The rise of hedge fund activists is due to several factors: First, while institutions such as mutual funds 
and pension funds are required to maintain sufficient levels of diversification to comply with regulations 
and enjoy certain tax benefits, hedge funds are largely free from such constraints. Nor are they subject to 
mutual funds’ more transparent disclosure requirements that make it difficult for mutual funds to obtain 
substantial ownership in companies without alerting management and, importantly, the market as to their 
intentions. In this way, hedge funds are able to accumulate large positions in target companies before 
announcing their campaign (Gillan and Starks 2007, Cheffins and Armour 2011). 
5 Another form of shareholder activism exists in which activists push target firms to adopt policies or 
practices that promote corporate social responsibility (CSR). In these cases, activists’ goals are aimed at 
increasing the welfare of parties other than shareholders, such as the community, company employees, or 
wildlife. Given the different goals of CSR activism and shareholder-centric activism and the fact that the 
proprietary data sources for activism that we use do not include CSR activist events, CSR activism is not 
the focus of this study. 
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Critics of shareholder activism contend that activists pressure managers to make 
decisions that result in positive short-term stock performance at the expense of long-term 
enterprise value. Martin Lipton, whose law firm specializes in takeover defense, has said 
that the short-term focus of shareholder activism has “led to the decline of the American 
economy and greater unemployment” (Lipton 2013c). Even billionaire investor Warren 
Buffett has criticized activists whose “short-term objectives have eroded faith in 
corporations continuing to be the foundation of the American free enterprise system…” 
(Blood et al. 2009).  
Echoing these concerns, congressional lawmakers recently proposed legislation 
that would modify the rules covering disclosure of activists’ positions. If an activist 
investor reaches a 5% “beneficial ownership” threshold, current rules require the activist 
to disclose its position by filing a Schedule 13D with the SEC within 10 days. The 
Brokaw Act would shorten the filing window from 10 to 2 days. The Act would also 
require activists to disclose significant short positions, and it would broaden the scope of 
financial instruments that constitute “beneficial ownership” to include any person with a 
“pecuniary or indirect pecuniary interest,” including through derivatives (Mirvis 2016). 
Shortly after this proposed legislation was announced, a group of prominent activists, 
including Carl Icahn, Bill Ackman, and Daniel Loeb, formed a lobbying group, the 
Council for Investor Rights and Corporate Accountability (CIRCA), to give activists 
their own voice in Washington. Activists argue that their proposals for change create 
value for pensioners and other investors and also reduce corporate waste. Thus, evidence 
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on whether activist investments are good or bad for long-term enterprise value is directly 
relevant to the ongoing debate in practice.  
Hypotheses for Non-Market Reactions to Investor Activism  
Analysts and Activist Interventions  
The ability of analyst recommendations to predict future returns and other value-
relevant events has been widely studied (Givoly and Lakonishok 1980; Womack 1996). 
Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001) show that a long-short trading strategy 
that buys (shorts) stocks with the most (least) favorable recommendations earns 
abnormal returns of 9% per year with daily rebalancing. Howe, Unlu, and Yan (2009) 
find that changes in aggregate analyst recommendations predict one-quarter-ahead 
earnings growth and future excess returns at the firm and industry-level. Clarke, Ferris, 
Jayaraman, and Lee (2006) find that stock recommendations are more pessimistic for 
firms that later file for bankruptcy. These studies suggest that analysts’ stock 
recommendations are informative about companies’ future prospects. Accordingly, to 
the extent that analysts perceive an improvement (deterioration) in the prospects of 
targets after the announcement of an activist intervention, we expect the average 
recommendation to be more favorable (unfavorable) in the post-intervention period. 
However, even if activism is beneficial, recommendation levels may not return to pre-
intervention levels if the positive market reaction around the announcement date fully 
captures any increase in enterprise value. This expectation forms the basis of our first 
hypothesis, stated in the null: 
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H1: Activist interventions are unrelated to future changes in analyst 
recommendations. 
Short Sellers and Activist Interventions 
Studies have found short sellers to be informed traders who, in a variety of 
settings, are able to anticipate future declines in shareholder value. Diether, Lee, and 
Werner (2009) find that short sellers increase their trading following positive returns and 
high levels of short selling are followed by negative returns, consistent with short sellers 
trading on a short-term, stock price overreaction. Ben-David, Drake, and Roulstone 
(2015) show that high short interest proxies for overvaluation in an acquisition. They 
find that stock (cash) acquirers have high (low) short interest and that stock acquirers 
with the highest short interest underperform the market in the post-announcement 
period. Liu and Swanson (2016) find that companies that increase share buybacks and 
experience a concurrent increase in short interest subsequently report a sharp decline in 
return-on-assets. In light of these findings, if a positive market reaction to activism 
announcements causes target companies to be overvalued, we expect short interest to 
increase in the post-intervention period. On the other hand, if the stock is undervalued or 
fairly valued after the activist announcement, we expect short interest to decline or 
remain unchanged in the post-intervention period. These competing expectations form 
the basis of our second null hypothesis: 
H2: Activist interventions are unrelated to future changes in short interest. 
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Firm Fundamentals around Activist Interventions 
A number of studies examine the effect of investor activism on targets’ operating 
performance. Commonly used measures include return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), and Tobin’s Q. 6 While some studies find increases in, say, ROA (Brav, Jiang, 
Partnoy, and Thomas 2008; Boyson and Mooradian 2011), others find no significant 
change (Klein and Zur 2011; Gantchev, Gredil, and Jotikasthira 2016). Critics have 
argued that, because changes in these variables can be driven by a numerator or 
denominator effect (or both), any improvement along these dimensions may be the result 
of balance-sheet engineering (e.g., share buybacks that reduce equity or asset 
divestitures that reduce assets). Thus, firms that underinvest can report better short-term 
operating performance at the expense of long-term performance. In response to those 
criticisms, we use a broader measure of firm fundamentals than used in prior research. 
Our measure, the FScore, incorporates nine signals of operating performance used in 
financial statement analysis. Given the mixed results found in prior literature, we state 
our hypothesis on the relation between activist interventions and firm fundamentals in 
the null: 
H3: Activist interventions are unrelated to future changes in firm fundamentals. 
  
                                                 
6 ROA and Tobin’s Q have been criticized as being subject to considerable measurement error (Allaire and 
Dauphin, 2014; Dybvig and Warachka, 2015). This controversy motivates our use of the FScore, which 
incorporates ROA and several other accounting measures.   
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Ownership by Short- and Long-Horizon Institutional Investors and Activist Interventions 
 One avenue through which activism may impact target firm value is through its 
effect on managerial myopia. Critics contend that activism encourages management to 
take actions that benefit earnings in the short-term at the expense of long-run enterprise 
value. Prior studies have investigated this claim by examining the effect of activism on 
future capital investment, shareholder payouts (which reduce funds available for future 
investment), R&D spending, and innovation (e.g., Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang 2015; Brav, 
Jiang, and Kim 2015; Brav, Jiang, Ma, and Tian 2016). Ex ante, it is unclear whether 
these actions are beneficial or detrimental to long-term value without knowledge of the 
target firm’s pre-intervention optimal level of investment. For example, Brav, Jiang, Ma, 
and Tian (2016) find that, despite post-intervention decreases in R&D spending, target 
firms actually experience an increase in innovation output (measured as patent and 
citation counts). Similarly, in an analysis of productivity at manufacturing plants owned 
by activist targets, Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2015) find that, despite a post-intervention 
decline or stagnation in the number of workers, hours per worker, and the average wage 
at plants owned by targets, both plant productivity and labor efficiency increase in the 
wake of an activist intervention. These examples indicate that a decrease in capital 
expenditure does not necessarily mean that activist interventions result in an undue focus 
on short-term performance at the expense of long-term value.  
 We employ an alternative method of investigating whether activism induces 
managerial short-termism by examining how activist interventions influence ownership 
by investors with different investment horizons. If activists pressure managers to take 
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actions that are primarily short-term oriented, such behavior may discourage ownership 
by investors with a long-term focus. We use the Bushee (2001) classification that 
categorizes institutional investors as dedicated, transient, or quasi-indexers. Bushee 
(2001) shows that investors with the greatest incentive to prefer near-term earnings over 
long-run value (i.e., transient investors who hold investments for a short time) do, in 
fact, exhibit such a preference. Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) provide evidence that 
dedicated institutions perform a monitoring role of gathering information and attempting 
to influence managers to avoid bad corporate acquisitions. Ramalingegowda (2014) 
shows that dedicated institutional investors trade in advance of an event that signifies a 
persistent (i.e., beyond the institutions’ trading horizon) loss in firm value, namely, 
corporate bankruptcy. In light of these findings, if critics are correct in arguing that 
activism induces short-termism at target firms at the expense of long-term enterprise 
value, we expect ownership by dedicated institutional investors to decline in the post-
intervention period. Dedicated institutional ownership would be expected to increase if 
activism encourages managerial decisions that are expected to increase the long-term 
value of target firms by more than the change in market capitalization around the 
intervention announcement. We state our hypothesis on the relation between activist 
interventions and dedicated institutional ownership in the null:  
H4: Activist interventions are unrelated to future ownership by dedicated 
institutional investors. 
Transient institutional investors are likely to be attracted by any price increase around 
the public announcement, since momentum influences their trades. Assuming the effects 
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of activism are likely to show up only gradually over time (as suggested by Gillan and 
Starks 2007, p. 66), transient investors are likely to reduce their ownership after the 
announcement in order to deploy their capital elsewhere. As a result, transient 
institutional ownership provides little information about whether the announcement price 
increase is permanent or transitory. Therefore, we do not hypothesize a relation between 
activist interventions and ownership by transient institutional investors. Nevertheless, we 
report the response of transient institutional owners so their response can be compared to 
dedicated institutional owners.  
Sources of Data and Variable Measurement 
Activist Data 
We use two sources to obtain information about activist events: 
SharkRepellent.net and Thomson One. Produced by Factset, SharkRepellent is a 
corporate governance database that offers real-time and historical coverage of 
companies’ takeover defense strategies, as well as information about investor activism 
campaigns, proxy proposals, and proxy fights. The information about activist campaigns 
includes the campaign announcement date, the purpose of the campaign, and the 
activist’s level of ownership at the time of the announcement. We were allowed a one-
time download that includes activism events from the mid-80s through early 2013. We 
also obtained activism events from Thomson One, whose coverage spans from 2000 to 
the present. From these two sources, we obtained the date of the activism announcement, 
whether the activist is prominent, and the activist’s objective. 
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Previous studies on shareholder activism have relied predominantly on hand-
collected samples from Schedule 13D filings (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 
2008; Greenwood and Schor 2009; Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang 2015; Cheng, Huang, and 
Krishnan 2015; Partnoy, and Thomas 2016). A limitation of 13D filings is that the 5% 
ownership threshold for filing means that activism announcements by investors owning 
less than 5% of outstanding shares are generally not included in 13D-based samples.7 
This limitation is not trivial: Of the 3095 activism events in the SharkRepellent sample 
with information related to the activist’s ownership percentage, 551 (about 18%) have 
ownership levels less than 5% at the time of the announcement. Given that the amount of 
capital required to obtain 5% ownership increases with firm size, 13D-based samples 
omit many of the most economically important activist interventions.  
An important advantage of our two sources of activist events is the relatively 
large sample size they offer. Because of the time involved in hand collection, sample 
sizes in prior studies vary significantly but are commonly under 2000 observations. We 
are able to match firm identifiers to 4871 activist campaigns, covering 2652 unique 
firms, over the period from 1994 to 2014. This sample allows a relatively comprehensive 
analysis of the effect of shareholder activism over the past two decades.8 While our 
                                                 
7 For example, when Carl Icahn sent a letter to Tim Cook on October 24, 2013 urging the Apple CEO to 
consider a $150 billion share buyback, Icahn’s ownership of 4.7 million shares amounted to less than 1% 
of Apple’s outstanding shares. Similarly, when Nelson Peltz’s Trian Fund announced its $2.5 billion 
position in General Electric and its campaign to persuade GE management to consider a share repurchase 
program, the hedge fund became one of the company’s top 10 shareholders, despite owning roughly 1% of 
shares outstanding (Benoit and Mann 2015). We searched through filings for several CIKs registered by 
Icahn and Peltz with the SEC and are unable to find 13D filings for either campaign. 
8 In all analyses, we use the maximum number of observations with the data needed for that analysis. The 
4871 activist events therefore represent an upper bound on the number of observations for any given 
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sample likely captures a greater number of activism events, the tradeoff is that we have 
less information about the construction of the sample compared to a hand-collected 
sample.9 However, potential bias from a focus on “prominent” activists does not seem to 
be a problem, since the results for that subsample are very similar to our reported 
results.10 Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process. 
Other Data 
We use I/B/E/S’s monthly recommendation file to obtain the average monthly 
recommendation level for a given firm (Meanrec). As constructed by I/B/E/S, the values 
range from 1 to 5 with lower numbers reflecting more favorable recommendations. We 
reverse the scale (1 = strong sell … 5 = strong buy) so that higher values of Meanrec 
reflect more favorable recommendations. We also use I/B/E/S to construct a measure of 
analyst following based on the number of unique analysts that make a quarterly or 
annual earnings forecast during the fiscal year. 
  
                                                 
analysis. Note that all reported results are qualitatively similar if we use a subsample containing a fixed set 
of observations over the event window. 
9 In personal communications, Thomson One representatives state that campaigns are identified from 
“proxy fights, public shareholder proposals, public letters to management, press releases, and selected 
SEC filings.” 
10 We classify an activist as prominent if it is included in SharkRepellant’s SharkWatch 50 or Thomson 
One’s “Prominent Activist” search option. We do not report these results separately to reduce the length of 
the paper.  
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Table 1. Activism Campaign Sample Selection 
Sample Criteria 
Shark Repellant 
1984 - 2013 
Thomson One 
2000 – 2014 
Activist 
Events 
All Activism Events 5116 2285 7401 
Less: Events for firms with no PERMNO (1462) (529) (1991) 
Less: Overlapping Events     (539) 
Maximum available   4871 
This table summarizes the sources used to identify activist events and the maximum number of activism 
events available for analysis, with 409 involving a proposal to sell all or part of the target company. The 
following categories from each dataset are classified as sale campaigns:  
 Shark Repellant: Hostile/Unsolicited Acquisition 
 Thomson One: Force Sale, Hostile Acquisition 
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We obtain monthly short selling data from Compustat. Prior to 2007, the stock 
exchanges compiled short interest once per month with the settlement date on the 15th 
day of the month or the closest trade date preceding the 15th. Starting in 2007, short 
interest is also compiled for a month-end settlement date. To be consistent throughout 
our sample period, we use only mid-month short interest. We calculate the short interest 
ratio, Shortint, for a given firm as the number of shares sold short as of the settlement 
date, scaled by shares outstanding. Stock market data and shares outstanding are 
obtained from CRSP, and the Fama-French risk factors used to calculate abnormal 
returns are from WRDS.11 
 We obtain the financial statement items used to calculate FScores and other 
control variables from Compustat. Piotroski (2000) developed the FScore as a way to 
distinguish between underpriced and overpriced high book-to-market (“value”) firms 
using accounting information. Underperforming value firms are the types of firms most 
likely to be targeted by an activist (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 2008). FScore uses 
nine financial signals to capture three characteristics: corporate performance, changes in 
leverage and liquidity, and changes in operating efficiency. By including nine signals, 
FScores are representative of the types of information that would be obtained from 
financial statement analysis. Appendix B describes each of the nine components and 
how they are calculated.  
                                                 
11 The risk factors are also available at Ken French’s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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Institutional ownership is reported quarterly and obtained from Thomson 
Reuters. We use data available on Bushee’s website to classify institutions according to 
their investment horizon.12 Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors as transient, 
dedicated, or quasi-indexers. We are interested in whether an activist intervention 
triggers changes in the investment horizon of informed owners. Therefore, we ignore 
quasi-indexers, who are less likely to trade in response to the disclosure of value-
relevant information. We calculate two variables, Own_Ded and Own_Tran, as the total 
number of shares owned by dedicated or transient institutional investors at quarter-end, 
each scaled by shares outstanding. We report both measures of institutional ownership, 
although we are primarily concerned with Own_Ded.  
Research Design 
Returns-based Tests 
We use returns-based tests that are similar to those in prior research. First, we 
examine target firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in the [-10, 5] trading-day 
window around the activism announcement date. Activists have 10 days after obtaining 
5% ownership to file Form 13D, so this window includes the market reaction on the date 
the activist reaches 5% ownership (Lilienfeld-Toal and Schnitzler 2014). It also includes 
returns arising from share purchases by other institutional investors, including those 
tipped off by an activist about the planned intervention. Such tipping is legal but 
                                                 
12 http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html  
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controversial.13 The abnormal return for target firm i on day t in the event window is 
calculated as the firm’s actual return less its expected or “normal” return. We estimate 
firm i’s expected (normal) return in two steps. First, using data for trading days [-120, -
21] relative to the activist announcement, we regress firm i’s excess returns (above the 
risk-free rate, Rfτ) on three risk factors described in Fama and French (1993): 
𝑅𝑖𝜏 − 𝑅𝑓𝜏 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝜏 − 𝑅𝑓𝜏) + 𝛽2𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝜏 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝜏 + 𝑢𝑖𝜏 
Rmτ-Rfτ is the market excess return on day τ, and HMLτ and SMBτ are the book-to-market 
and size factors on day τ, respectively. Next, we use the coefficients from this regression 
to calculate firm i’s expected or normal return on day t. Cumulative abnormal returns for 
firm i on day t are simply the cumulative sum of firm i’s abnormal returns during the 
window. We perform an analogous long-run analysis. We estimate loadings of monthly 
excess returns on monthly Fama-French factors over the [-37, -2] month window, which 
we use to calculate cumulative abnormal returns over the [-1, 24] month window. In 
addition to pooled analyses, we conduct subsample analyses based on the different types 
of activist demands, as described in Appendix C. 
Propensity-Score Matching 
Given that activism is a choice, it is possible that the characteristics of the 
companies targeted by activists drive any differences in performance observed after an 
                                                 
13 The term “wolf pack” is used to describe the situation when a lead activist recruits other activist 
investors prior to filing Schedule 13D. The practice is controversial due to its resemblance to insider 
trading in that the information is material and nonpublic. The practice is not illegal, however, because the 
activist does not breach a fiduciary or other duty because the activist’s investors benefit (Coffee and Palia 
(2016, 30).  
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intervention. Indeed, some critics argue that activists are simply better at identifying 
firms that are ripe for a turnaround, irrespective of the activists’ engagement with the 
firm. We therefore compare activist targets to a propensity-score matched sample of 
firms with similar pre-intervention characteristics. Target firms are matched to control 
firms in the fiscal year prior to the activism announcement. A detailed description of the 
matching procedure is presented in Appendix D. 
For our main tests, the event window covers the two years before and two years 
after the activist announcement in order to address the allegation that activism results in 
short-term improvements at the expense of long-term value. This length of time balances 
the tradeoff between having a long event window and the reduction of sample firms that 
occurs over time. The two-year, post-intervention period also satisfies the specific call 
by activist critics to evaluate the impact of activism, “not just in the short period after 
announcement of the activist interest, but after a 24-month period.” (Lipton 2013a).  
Analyst Response to Investor Activism 
We run the following two regressions to examine monthly changes in analyst 
recommendations around the activist announcement, with firm subscripts omitted for 
brevity:  
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒−24,−1 
+𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒−24,−1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸 
(1a) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑐 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒1,24 
+𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒1,24 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸 
(1b) 
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Our hypotheses focus on the post-announcement period (Equation 1b), but the pre- 
announcement period allows us to determine whether a trend observed after the 
announcement was already underway. Rather than include each month as a separate 
variable, which would require dozens of month-indicator variables and their interactions 
with the Activist indicator, we use a more parsimonious model that uses Evttime. This 
variable takes a value from -24 to -1 in Equation 1a and from 1 to 24 in Equation 1b. 
The tradeoff for parsimony is that the change must be linear to be statistically 
significant, which works against rejecting our hypothesis. Both pre- and post-
intervention models include year and industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered 
at the firm level.  
The control firms chosen using propensity-score matching proxy for the 
counterfactual of how analysts would have responded absent an activist campaign. 
Coefficient β1 is an intercept adjustment, and coefficient β3 represents the incremental 
slope, or monthly change in the recommendation level, of activist targets over control 
firms. The target firm’s response to the activist’s demand may take time, so the main 
coefficient of interest is β3. A positive (negative) coefficient would indicate that, as 
analysts obtain information about the target’s response, they recommend the target 
company’s stock more (less) favorably than they would have absent an activist 
campaign. Since the average stock price increases at the announcement, a more 
favorable post-announcement recommendation indicates analysts believe the price 
reaction to the announcement does not overstate firm value.  
  
 27 
 
Short Seller Response to Investor Activism 
To investigate whether activism influences short sellers’ perceptions about target 
firms’ future prospects, we modify Equations 1a and 1b to use short interest as the 
dependent variable: 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒−24,−1 
+𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒−24,−1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸 
(2a) 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒1,24 
+𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒1,24 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸 
(2b) 
As with analyst recommendations, we are primarily interested in the response to 
activism beyond the level that would be predicted absent an activist campaign, so the 
main coefficient of interest is β3. A positive (negative) coefficient for β3 in Equation 2b 
would indicate that short sellers believe (do not believe) the stock is overvalued after the 
market reaction to the intervention announcement. 
Investor Activism and Changes in Firm Fundamentals 
We measure firm fundamentals annually, so the model for pre- and post-
intervention differences in FScores uses individual-year indicator variables (instead of 
Evttime). To examine pre- and post-intervention differences in fundamentals, we run the 
following two regressions: 
𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 
+𝛽4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸 
(3a) 
𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡+1 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡+1 (3b) 
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+𝛽4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡+2 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡+2 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸 
The Year variables are indicator variables that equal one when the observation takes 
place during the year denoted by the subscript, with year t as the announcement year. 
Our primary interest is in the coefficients 𝛽3 and 𝛽5 during the post-intervention period 
(Equation 3b), where a positive (negative) value would indicate the financial 
performance of target firms has increased (decreased) compared to control firms.  
Ownership by Short- and Long-Horizon Institutional Investors and Activism 
 Our analysis of ownership by institutional investors uses a linear time trend 
variable that is analogous to the recommendation and short interest models. The 
difference, apart from the dependent variables used (dedicated or transient), is that the 
Evttime variable corresponds to a given quarter, instead of month, relative to the 
activism announcement. The pre-intervention period extends from quarter -7 to quarter 
0, the last calendar quarter before the activism announcement. The post-intervention 
period extends from quarter 1 to quarter 8. 
𝑂𝑤𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑑[𝑂𝑤𝑛_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒−7,0 
+𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒−7,0 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 
+𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸 
(4a[c]) 
𝑂𝑤𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑑[𝑂𝑤𝑛_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒1,8 
+𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒1,8 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 
+𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸 
(4b[d]) 
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Like our short-interest and recommendation tests above, we are primarily interested in 
the coefficient on β3 during the post-intervention period, which measures the difference 
in ownership for activist targets relative to control firms after the activist announcement.  
Results 
Market Reactions to Investor Activism 
Figure 2 displays cumulative abnormal returns in the [-10, 5] trading-day 
window around the activism announcement date.14 Consistent with other studies (e.g., 
Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 2008; Greenwood and Schor 2009), Panel A shows a 
sizable abnormal return in the days surrounding the announcement (about 4.5%). Similar 
to the finding in Greenwood and Schor (2009), Panel B reveals that the average return is 
much larger (about 17%) for campaigns to put the company (or part of it) up for sale. 
The return for the other (non-sale) campaigns is about 3.5%, which is still sizable for a 
16-day period. Panel C shows that the average returns for first and second wave of 
activism are very similar. This result is surprising, given the large number of new 
activists (as discussed previously and displayed in Figure 1). 
  
                                                 
14 When measuring abnormal returns, some studies calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns (e.g., Brav, 
Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 2008) whereas others calculate cumulative abnormal returns (e.g., Greenwood 
and Schor 2009). In short windows (e.g., less than one year), differences between the two measures are 
negligible (Kothari and Warner 1997), and in our setting, all inferences are the same, regardless of the 
return aggregation method used. 
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Figure 2. Short-Window Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Activism 
Announcements 
Panel A: All Activist Announcements 
 
 
Panel B: for Sale vs. Non-Sale Activist Announcements 
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Figure 2 Continued 
Panel C: First and Second Waves of Activist Announcements 
 
The figures plot cumulative abnormal returns for the [-10, 5] trading-day window around activism 
announcements for the pooled sample of all activist announcements. Panel B separates the returns into 
instances in which activists demand a sale of all or a portion of the target firm compared to all other 
instances. Panel C plots returns separately for interventions announced from 1994 to 2007 and from 2008 
to 2014. Abnormal returns for firm i on each day t in the [-10, 5] day event period are calculated as firm i’s 
total returns on day t less its expected return on day t. Expected returns are calculated using the Fama and 
French (1993) 3-factor model. Specifically, daily excess returns for firm i are regressed on the daily 
market excess return, a book-to-market factor (HML) and a size factor (SMB) for days [-120, -21] in the 
preannouncement period. Parameter estimates from this regression are multiplied by day t’s risk factors to 
create expected or normal return.
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Table 2 reports the statistical significance of the returns displayed in Figure 2. 
The cumulative returns for the full sample (all events) become statistically significant 
about 7 days prior to announcement day 0 (t-value = 2.66). This finding could result 
from some activists filing SEC Form 13D prior to the 10-day deadline, or some traders 
may learn that an activist is accumulating an ownership position (possibly creating a 
“wolf pack”). Despite the upward drift in price, most of the price reaction occurs on the 
six days beginning with announcement day 0. The average returns over the full 16-day 
window are highly statistically significant for all activist events (4.63%), for 
interventions involving a sale of assets (16.95%), and for non-sale events (3.48%). This 
last result differs from the insignificant returns reported by Greenwood and Schor (2009) 
for non-sale events between 1993 and 2006. The magnitudes of these returns are 
striking, as even the smallest return (3.48% for the non-sale events) is almost 50% 
annualized.15 Table 2, Panel B, provides a breakdown by type of non-sale event reported 
in the 13D filing. The largest return for non-sale events is for interventions involving 
corporate strategy, at 6.69%, a category that includes a return of capital by increasing 
stock buybacks. This category also includes 89 campaigns for a corporate spinoff from 
the Thomson One database.  
  
                                                 
15 We note that the positive returns could result from the actions demanded by the activist or from actions 
that managers take that differ from the activist demands. For example, Nelson Peltz’s Trian Fund 
Management was unsuccessful in a campaign to break up the beverage and snack businesses of PepsiCo 
Inc., but the fund still earned a substantial profit when management responded to “intense pressure” from 
the activist and improved operating results by cost cutting (Benoit and Esterly 2016). 
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Table 2. Short-Window Returns around Activism Announcements 
Panel A: All Events with Dichotomy into Sales vs. Non-Sales Events 
 
All events Sale Non-Sale 
Day CAR (%) t-stat CAR (%) t-stat CAR (%) t-stat 
-10 0.13 1.15 0.48 2.11 0.10 0.81 
-9 0.05 0.56 0.54 1.92 0.01 0.06 
-8 0.22 1.79 0.22 0.57 0.22 1.70 
-7 0.37 2.66 0.78 1.67 0.33 2.27 
-6 0.57 3.75 1.52 2.66 0.48 3.06 
-5 0.69 3.23 1.94 3.25 0.58 2.54 
-4 0.94 5.27 2.50 3.85 0.79 4.29 
-3 1.12 5.11 2.98 4.54 0.95 4.09 
-2 1.14 3.50 3.08 4.54 0.96 2.74 
-1 1.28 2.45 3.99 5.67 1.03 1.81 
0 2.99 7.94 12.39 12.63 2.12 5.31 
1 3.87 9.55 16.43 15.58 2.70 6.31 
2 4.20 11.21 16.79 15.86 3.03 7.71 
3 4.25 10.61 16.98 15.89 3.07 7.26 
4 4.38 10.70 16.99 15.85 3.20 7.42 
5 4.63 13.02 16.95 15.83 3.48 9.39 
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Table 2 Continued 
Panel B: Breakdown by Type of Non-Sale Event 
 
Board 
Composition 
Engage 
Management 
Corporate Strategy 
Corporate 
Governance 
Other 
Day CAR 
(%) 
t-stat CAR 
(%) 
t-stat CAR 
(%) 
t-stat CAR 
(%) 
t-stat CAR 
(%) 
t-stat 
-10 0.23 0.82 0.02 0.19 0.15 0.52 -0.31 -1.72 -0.13 -1.05 
-5 0.23 0.50 0.66 2.37 2.05 3.90 0.59 1.33 0.04 0.12 
-4 0.41 1.47 0.88 3.07 2.28 4.26 0.76 1.70 0.05 0.13 
-3 0.47 1.11 1.07 3.36 2.87 4.85 0.92 2.00 0.10 0.25 
-2 0.36 0.46 1.10 3.18 3.14 4.59 1.22 2.40 0.13 0.33 
-1 0.00 0.00 1.45 4.06 4.17 5.62 1.45 2.58 0.23 0.50 
0 1.54 1.70 2.42 6.53 5.55 6.91 2.54 3.99 0.41 0.87 
1 2.13 2.19 3.19 8.34 6.13 7.83 3.14 4.79 0.25 0.48 
2 2.67 3.07 3.45 8.69 6.39 8.35 3.46 5.00 0.54 1.06 
3 2.79 2.94 3.43 8.41 6.53 8.26 3.65 4.93 0.78 1.50 
4 3.00 3.10 3.51 8.39 6.72 8.50 3.74 4.92 1.01 1.90 
5 3.38 4.31 3.92 9.35 6.69 8.04 3.74 4.72 0.91 1.70 
This table presents short-window returns around activism announcements. Panel A presents cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for 
target firms over the [-10, 5] day window around the activist announcement. CARs are shown for all activist announcements, those 
demanding a sale of all or part of the company (Sale=1), and all other, non-sale events (Sale=0). Panel B presents cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) for target firms over the [-10, 5] day window around the activist announcement. CARs for various activist demands are 
shown for all non-sale activist announcements (SALE=0). Thus, Panel B is an expanded, more granular analysis of the rightmost 
subsample analyzed in Panel A.  
 
See Appendix C for descriptions of the various types of activist demands. 
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The returns to interventions related to board composition, corporate governance, or 
engaging management are similar, ranging from 3% to 4%. Appendix C provides 
information about the specific types of events included in each category.  
Critics argue that the positive short-window returns to activist interventions are 
short-term and likely to reverse over a longer period. To investigate this possibility, we 
calculate CARs from one month prior to the intervention to 24 months afterward. In 
untabulated results, we find the CARs are positive, sizable, increase monotonically, and 
are highly statistically significant. Averaged across all events, the cumulative return is 
11.57% from month -1 to month 24. The sale and non-sale events are 22.67% and 
10.51%, respectively. Returns are positive for each type of non-sale event and are above 
10% for the categories of board composition, engage management, and corporate 
strategy. The returns for corporate governance and a catch-all category of “other” 
activist demands are statistically indistinguishable from zero. In sum, long-window 
returns provide no evidence of a reversal of the short-window returns; instead, the 
returns increase over the next 24 months.  
Although we find statistically significant positive long-window returns, Lyon, 
Barber, and Tsai (1999) argue that “analysis of long-run abnormal returns is 
treacherous” and Kothari and Warner (1997) contend that conclusions drawn from long-
window analyses “require extreme caution.” Motivated, in part, by the empirical 
shortcomings of long-window-return tests, we examine how various market participants 
who invest heavily in information acquisition and interpretation—short sellers, analysts, 
and institutional investors—respond to activist interventions.  
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Analyst Response to Investor Activism 
 Figure 3, Panel A, displays the average analyst recommendation, Meanrec, 
beginning 24 months prior and ending 24 months after the activist announcement. The 
average recommendation for target firms and their matched control counterparts is 
similar until about six months before the activist announcement. At that point, 
recommendations for targeted firms decline sharply (becoming less favorable), and this 
decline continues until the month of the activist announcement, indicating that analysts 
do not expect the company’s prospects to improve prior to the intervention. The average 
recommendation then stabilizes for a few months (as analysts digest the implications of 
the intervention) and then improves throughout the remainder of the post-intervention 
period.16 To provide insight into the nature of the recommendation change, we plot the 
frequency of buy recommendations in Panel B of Figure 3. The trend for Buypct is very 
similar to the trend for Meanrec. In untabulated analyses, we find that the pre-
intervention deterioration in the mean recommendation relative to control firms is driven 
by recommendation downgrades from buy to hold, and the post-intervention 
improvement is driven by upgrades from hold to buy. Sell recommendations change very 
little.  
  
                                                 
16 The average recommendation is slightly lower at the end of the test period than at the start. This is not 
surprising because the stock price usually increases substantially around the announcement of an activist 
share purchase. The important finding is that the average recommendation increases significantly after the 
activist intervention.  
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Figure 3. Analyst Recommendations around Activism Campaigns 
Panel A: Mean Recommendation Levels for All Campaigns  
 
 
Panel B: Prevalence of Buy Recommendations for All Campaigns  
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Figure 3 Continued 
Panel C: Mean Recommendation Levels for Sale Campaigns 
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Figure 3 Continued 
Panel D: Mean Recommendation Levels for Non-Sale Campaigns 
 
Panel A plots average monthly recommendation levels for activist targets and control firms on a scale of 1 
to 5 with higher numbers for Meanrec more favorable. Panel B reports buy recommendations as a 
percentage of total recommendations. Panel C plots average monthly recommendation levels for target and 
control firms for activist campaigns that seek a sale of all or a portion of the target firm. Panel D plots 
average monthly recommendation levels for target and control firms for all other, non-sale campaigns.  
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Table 3 reports the results for the model used in hypothesis testing. In the pre-
intervention period, the coefficients on Activist and Evttime are negative and statistically 
significant, but the interaction term between the two variables is insignificant. This 
indicates that, although Figure 3 shows a steeper decline in recommendations for target 
firms in the six months prior to the intervention, the incremental difference in slopes is 
insignificant over 24 months. After the activist intervention, the coefficient on 
Activist*Evttime changes to positive and is statistically significant (see shaded area). 
This is an important result, as it shows that analysts view stock in the target firms more 
favorably after the activist intervention.  
We also plot changes in recommendations for two subsamples: campaigns that 
seek a sale of all, or part, of the company (Figure 3, Panel C) and those that do not 
involve a sale (Figure 3, Panel D). For both subsamples, the average recommendation 
declines in the pre-intervention period and improves in the post-intervention period. 
However, the decline and subsequent improvement in recommendations are greater for 
sale than for non-sale campaigns. The favorable recommendation for sale firms is 
especially notable because it occurs after the average stock price has increased about 
17% around the activist announcement.  
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Table 3. Pre- and Post-Intervention Changes in Mean Analyst Recommendations 
 Equation 1a Equation 1b 
Variables Pre-intervention Post-intervention 
Activist -0.0510** -0.174*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0251) 
Evttime -0.00401*** 0.00157 
 (0.000860) (0.00102) 
Activist*Evttime -0.00193 0.00329** 
 (0.00126) (0.00150) 
Constant 3.364*** 2.986*** 
 (0.0877) (0.253) 
   
N 122,922 87,088 
Adjusted R-squared 0.038 0.043 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
Cluster by firm YES YES 
Event Window (Months) [-24, -1] [1, 24] 
This table presents the results of estimating Equations 1a and b. Equation 1a estimates the change in 
analyst recommendations in the pre-intervention period, and Equation 1b estimates the change in the 
post-intervention period.  
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, with two-
tailed p-values, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the firm-level. 
 
Appendix A provides the variable definitions. 
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Based on the results presented in Figure 3 and Table 3, we reject H1: “Activist 
interventions are unrelated to future changes in analyst recommendations.” Instead, 
empirical evidence shows that analysts view activist interventions as increasing long-
term equity value. 
Short Seller Response to Investor Activism 
Figure 4, Panel A, displays the short interest ratio (short interest deflated by 
shares outstanding) for target and control firms in the 48 months surrounding the activist 
intervention.17 Short interest is initially lower for the target firms than control firms; 
however, it increases during the 12 months leading up to the activist share purchase until 
it is similar to control firms. Starting in the month of the intervention, short interest in 
the target firms begins a sharp decline, reaching a new low. Short sellers clearly do not 
anticipate the activist intervention. 
 
  
                                                 
17 We also calculated an abnormal short interest ratio by deducting the mean short interest ratio for all 
firms in the Compustat universe on that day. The pattern is virtually identical to that reported in Panel A, 
so it is not tabulated. 
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Figure 4. Short Interest around Activism Campaigns 
Panel A: Short Interest for All Campaigns 
 
 
Panel B: Short Interest for Sale Campaigns 
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Figure 4 Continued 
Panel C: Short Interest for Non-Sale Campaigns 
 
The figures plot the mean short interest ratio, calculated as short interest scaled by shares outstanding 
(Shortint). Panel A reports Shortint for the full sample of target and control firms. Panel B reports Shortint 
for activist campaigns that seek a sale of all or a portion of the target company. Panel C presents Shortint 
for all other, non-sale campaigns.   
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Table 4 reports results for the model used in hypothesis testing. In the pre-
intervention period, the coefficient on the interaction term, Activist*Evttime, is positive 
and statistically significant, meaning that target firms experience an increase in short 
interest relative to control firms. In the post-intervention period, the coefficient on 
Activist*Evttime is negative and statistically significant (see shaded area), so short sellers 
significantly reduce their positions in the targeted firms. The reduction in short interest 
occurs even though most targets experience an increase in stock price at the activist 
announcement. Short sellers therefore trade as if that price increase is long-lasting.  
Figure 4 also displays the short interest ratio for interventions that seek a sale of all, or 
part, of the company (Figure 4, Panel B) and those that do not involve a sale (Figure 4, 
Panel C). The decline is sharp for sale-motivated campaigns, possibly because a price 
increase averaging 17% forces many short sellers to cover their (losing) position. The 
decline is modest for the non-sale interventions; however, an increase would be expected 
if the price increase that most targets experience around the activist announcement 
results in overvaluation.  
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Table 4. Pre- and Post-Intervention Changes in Short Interest 
 Equation 2a Equation 2b 
Variables Pre-intervention Post-intervention 
Activist 0.000754 -0.000213 
 (0.00198) (0.00212) 
Evttime 3.01e-05 -1.32e-05 
 (5.31e-05) (6.59e-05) 
Activist*Evttime 0.000249*** -0.000200** 
 (8.19e-05) (9.74e-05) 
Constant 0.0153 0.00260 
 (0.0115) (0.00636) 
   
N 166,044 127,594 
Adjusted R-squared 0.059 0.074 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
Cluster by firm YES YES 
Event Window (Months) [-24, -1] [1, 24] 
This table presents the results of estimating Equations 2a and b. Equation 2a estimates the change in 
short interest in the pre-intervention period, whereas Equation 2b estimates the change in the post-
intervention period. 
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, with two-
tailed p-values, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the firm-level. 
 
Appendix A provides the variable definitions. 
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Taken together, the analyses in Figure 4 and Table 4 allow us to reject H2: 
“Activist interventions are unrelated to future changes in short selling.” Instead, short 
sellers behave as if the equity for target firms is not overvalued, despite a substantial 
price increase around the activist announcement for most targets.  
Investor Activism and Changes in Firm Fundamentals 
Figure 5 reports on the operating performance of target and control firms using 
FScores calculated from annual financial statement data. Two years prior to the activism 
announcement, target firms and their matched control counterparts have almost identical 
FScores. This is not surprising because operating performance is one of the factors used 
in matching target with control firms. The financial health of target firms then 
deteriorates in the year of the activism announcement (year 0), so that target firms have 
lower FScores than control firms. Firm performance improves thereafter, and activist 
targets have somewhat higher FScores than control firms in the second year after the 
intervention. 
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Figure 5. Changes in Financial Statement Fundamentals Using FScores 
 
This figure plots annual FScores for target and control firms for the five fiscal years centered on the year 
of the activism announcement. Calculated annually, FScores are constructed as the sum of 9 binary signals 
related to firm fundamentals. See Appendix B for a detailed description of the nine signals and how they 
are calculated.
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Table 5 reports results for the model used in hypothesis testing. For the pre-
intervention period, the holdout year is t-2, which is followed by year t-1, and then the 
intervention year t. This allows positive coefficients to be interpreted as improved 
financial performance. The significant negative coefficient on Yeart-1 indicates that 
financial statement fundamentals are deteriorating for both target and control firms. 
During year t, the interaction term, Activist*Yeart, is significantly negative so the 
deterioration continues for targets but not for controls. This pattern changes at the 
activist intervention. In the post-intervention period, the holdout year is t, which is 
followed by year t+1, and year t+2. The significant positive coefficient on both 
Activist*Yeart+1 and Activist*Yeart+2 (see shaded areas) means that the target firms 
experience a statistically significant improvement in fundamentals compared to the 
control firms. The coefficients on Yeart +1 and Yeart +2 are insignificant, so the 
improvement does not occur for control firms.  
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Table 5. Changes in Firm Fundamentals (FScores) for Years around Activism 
Announcements 
 Equation 4a Equation 4b 
Variables Pre-intervention Post-intervention 
Activist 0.000411 -0.204*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0454) 
Yeart -1 -0.119***  
 (0.0366)  
Activist*Yeart -1 0.0213  
 (0.0528)  
Yeart 0.0312  
 (0.0427)  
Activist*Yeart -0.204***  
 (0.0596)  
Yeart +1  -0.00687 
  (0.0465) 
Activist*Yeart +1  0.173*** 
  (0.0633) 
Yeart +2  -0.0408 
  (0.0524) 
Activist*Yeart +2  0.316*** 
  (0.0720) 
Constant 2.302*** 3.985*** 
 (0.420) (0.729) 
N 13,830 9,316 
Adjusted R-squared 0.042 0.044 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
Cluster by firm YES YES 
Event Window (Years) [-2, 0] [0, 2] 
This table presents the results of estimating Equations 3a and b. Equation 4a estimates the change in firm 
fundamentals (FScore) in the pre-intervention period, whereas Equation 4b estimates the change in the 
post-intervention period. The hold-out year in each regression is the first year in each period, year t-2 for 
the pre-intervention period and year t for the post-intervention period. Negative (positive) coefficients on 
the year indicator variables therefore indicate declining (improving) fundamentals in the period tested. 
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, with two-
tailed p-values, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the firm-level. 
 
Appendix A provides the variable definition
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Taken together, our analysis of FScores allows us to reject H3: “Activist 
interventions are unrelated to future changes in firm fundamentals.” Instead, accounting 
fundamentals show a significant improvement in the operating performance of target 
firms after the activist intervention. The improvement in accounting fundamentals in the 
post-intervention period is consistent with the positive long-window returns, more 
favorable analyst recommendations, and lower short interest after the intervention.  
Ownership by Short- and Long-Horizon Institutional Investors and Activism 
 Changes in ownership by dedicated (and transient) institutional investors are 
displayed in Figure 6 with statistical significance tested in Table 6. We are primarily 
interested in ownership by dedicated institutional investors and whether it differs after 
the intervention. However, we also report on ownership by transient institutional 
investors to determine whether any changes we observe for dedicated institutional 
investors also occur for transient institutional investors. If so, we could not attribute the 
change in dedicated institutional investors to their longer investment horizon.  
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Table 6. Pre- and Post-Intervention Ownership by Dedicated and Transient Institutional Investors 
 Own_Ded Own_Ded Own_Tran Own_Tran 
Variables Pre-intervention (4a) Post-intervention (4b) Pre-intervention (4c) Post-intervention (4d) 
Activist 0.00233 0.00377 0.00340 0.0136*** 
 (0.00414) (0.00482) (0.00380) (0.00475) 
Evttime 0.000318 -0.000999** 0.000133 -0.000162 
 (0.000377) (0.000496) (0.000323) (0.000490) 
Activist*Evttime 0.000132 0.00186*** 0.000738 -0.00263*** 
 (0.000502) (0.000713) (0.000492) (0.000715) 
Constant 0.0540 0.0809*** 0.139* 0.0836* 
 (0.0441) (0.0298) (0.0803) (0.0487) 
     
N 37,798 24,452 52,006 35,204 
Adjusted R-squared 0.024 0.010 0.077 0.067 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Cluster by firm YES YES YES YES 
Event Window 
(Quarters) 
[-7, 0] [1, 8] [-7, 0] [1, 8] 
This panel presents the results of estimating Equations 4a through d. Equations 4a and c estimate, respectively, the change in ownership by dedicated 
and transient institutional investors in the pre-intervention period, whereas Equations 4b and d estimate the change in ownership in the post-
intervention period. 
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, with two-tailed p-values, calculated based on standard 
errors clustered at the firm-level. 
 
Appendix A provides the variable definitions. 
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Figure 6, Panel A, shows that ownership by long-term dedicated investors, 
Own_Ded, is steady and very similar for target and control firms prior to the activist 
announcement. This is confirmed by the results for Table 6, Equation 4a, where all 
coefficients are insignificant. This finding is significant because it is inconsistent with 
the allegation that the value from activist interventions is “appropriated from fellow 
stockholders with longer-term investment horizons… (Lipton 2013b)”. That is, we find 
no evidence of a decline in dedicated ownership, which would indicate that activists 
accumulate their stakes by purchasing shares from long-term investors. Moreover, 
Figure 6, Panel A, shows that beginning in the intervention quarter, ownership of target 
and control firms by long-term institutional owners diverges, with increases for target 
firms and decreases for control firms. Equation 4b on Table 6 shows that the coefficient 
on Activist*Evttime is significantly positive, while Evttime (which shows the change for 
control firms) is significantly negative. The significant increase in ownership by 
dedicated institutional investors compared to matched control firms is inconsistent with a 
short-term positive effect from activism.  
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Figure 6. Institutional Ownership around Activism Campaigns 
Panel A: Ownership by Dedicated (Long-term) Institutional Investors for All Campaigns 
 
 
Panel B: Ownership by Transient (Short-term) Institutional Investors for All Campaigns 
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Figure 6 Continued 
Panel C: Ownership by Dedicated Institutional Investors for Sale Campaigns 
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Figure 6 Continued 
 
Panel D: Ownership by Dedicated Institutional Investors for Non-Sale Campaigns 
 
The figures plot quarterly share ownership, scaled by shares outstanding, by institutional investors for 
target and control firms. Panel A depicts ownership by dedicated institutional investors (Own_Ded) for all 
campaigns. Panel B depicts ownership by transient institutional investors (Own_Tran) for all campaigns. 
Panel C reports Own_Ded for campaigns that seek a sale of all or a portion of the target firm. Panel D 
reports Own_Ded for all other non-sale campaigns. Activist ownership is announced in quarter 1. 
Institutional investor classifications were developed in Bushee (1998) and can be found at Bushee’s 
website: http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html. 
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This increase in ownership by dedicated institutional investors after the 
intervention is also different from the changes in ownership by transient institutional 
investors. Figure 6, Panel B, shows that ownership by transient institutional investors, 
Own_Tran, is similar for target and control firms prior to the activist announcement. 
This is confirmed by insignificant coefficients for Equation 4c on Table 6. Figure 6, 
Panel B, shows that transient ownership then increases sharply in announcement quarter 
0 and this increase continues into quarter 1. (This increase in transient ownership could 
arise from momentum traders trying to capture the positive returns that occur around 
activist announcements.) After quarter 1, transient ownership in target firms declines 
sharply and, after four months, it is similar to control firms. The decline is statistically 
significant, as indicated by the significant negative coefficient for Activist*Evttime in 
Equation 4d on Table 6. This decline contrasts with the significant increase by dedicated 
owners (i.e., Equation 4b). In sum, we find that the pattern of changes in dedicated and 
transitory ownership is quite different after an activist intervention, consistent with their 
differing preferences for short- and long-term performance.  
Panels C and D of Figure 6 plot ownership by dedicated investors for sale and 
non-sale campaigns respectively. The post-intervention increase in ownership by 
dedicated investors is largest at firms that are targeted for a sale, for whom Ded_Own 
increases from 8.7% to 14.7% over the two years following the campaign announcement 
(a marginal increase of 69%). The marginal increase for non-sale campaigns is much 
smaller (about 5%). Consistent with Greenwood and Schor (2009) and our findings for 
stock returns, analyst recommendations, and short interest, institutional investors react 
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strongest to campaigns in which activists demand sale of all or a portion of the target 
firm. 
Taken together, empirical analyses of long-term dedicated investors, Own_Ded, 
allows us to reject H4: “Activist interventions are unrelated to future ownership by 
dedicated institutional investors.” Instead, dedicated institutional investors substantially 
increase their ownership during the eight quarters after the activist intervention. 
Dedicated institutional investors therefore trade in a manner that is inconsistent with 
activism inducing short-termism at target firms.  
Additional Discussion of Short- and Long-Horizon Institutional Investors 
Finding a significant increase in ownership by dedicated institutional investors 
should be considered in the context of prior research. Studies prior to Ramalingegowda 
(2014) find little evidence that dedicated investors anticipate and trade in advance of 
significant corporate events, such as earnings restatements or a break in a string of 
consecutive earnings increases (e.g., Hribar, Jenkins, and Wang 2009; Ke and Petroni 
2004). Ramalingegowda (2014) finds that long-term investors do trade in advance of 
bankruptcies, and one possible explanation for this finding is that dedicated investors 
may only trade ahead of events that result in large, persistent changes in firm value. If 
true, then the increase in dedicated ownership that we document is consistent with 
activism leading to a persistent increase in target firm value. Prior research also provides 
evidence that ownership by dedicated investors leads to various favorable outcomes. 
Bushee and Noe (2000) show that dedicated ownership contributes to lower future stock 
return volatility. In an M&A setting, Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) find that ownership 
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by long-term investors is positively related to post-merger performance and to the 
likelihood of withdrawal of a bad bid. Demiralp, D’Mello, Schlingemann, and 
Subramaniam (2011) show that dedicated ownership is positively associated with returns 
around the announcement of seasoned equity offerings and that post-issue returns are 
positively associated with contemporaneous changes in dedicated ownership. These 
studies suggest that the post-intervention prospects of target firms may improve, at least 
in part, because dedicated investors monitor and encourage managers to make value-
enhancing decisions.  
Robustness Checks 
We perform several additional tests to investigate the robustness of these 
findings. In untabulated analyses, we restrict the sample to only those firms that are 
observed over the entire window used in each test. Although such a restriction may 
induce survival bias by eliminating certain types of firms from the sample (e.g., firms 
that merge or are acquired, young firms, firms that are delisted for performance reasons, 
and firms that are targeted later than 2012 that do not have 2 years of post-intervention 
data), it is a useful exercise to investigate the extent to which the observed pattern, 
especially over long windows, is due to changes in sample composition across the event 
window. Despite a significant decrease in sample size, we find qualitatively similar 
results. 
The results for analyst recommendations, short selling, financial statement 
fundamentals, and institutional ownership compare observations for target firms to 
control firms with similar characteristics. The control firms are selected using propensity 
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score matching. Allison (2005, 1-3) comments that no matter how many variables a 
model controls for, it may be subject to criticisms of omitted-variable bias or 
measurement-error bias. Allison argues for using fixed effects models whenever the 
dependent variable of interest is measured at more than one point in time. Fixed effects 
models examine within-firm variation, thereby using each target firm as its own control. 
In addition to controlling for time-invariant factors, a fixed effects model allows us to 
use all the sample target firms, rather than only those with a suitable control firm.  
We run an OLS regression with firm fixed effects for each dependent variable of 
interest (Meanrec, Shortint, FScore, Own_Ded, and Own_Tran), where  
𝐷𝑒𝑝. 𝑉𝑎𝑟. =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀 
Post is an indicator variable that equals 1 for observations measured after the 
intervention announcement. Evttime is a monthly or quarterly linear time series variable, 
depending on the measurement frequency of the outcome variable. The interaction term, 
Post*Evttime, allows the slope (change over time) in the dependent variable to vary 
between the pre- and post-intervention periods. By including a series of indicator 
variables in the model, one for each activist target, the regression coefficients are 
identified using within-firm variation only, effectively allowing each activist target to 
serve as its own control. We run a fixed effect model for each of the dependent variables 
listed above and the results are consistent with those reported. 
In our last robustness test, we use three alternative classifications of institutions’ 
investment horizon to examine ownership changes over time by short- and long-term 
institutional investors. In contrast to Bushee’s measure, which classifies firms as 
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transient, dedicated, or quasi-indexers according to (1) their level of portfolio turnover 
and (2) their level of portfolio diversification, the three alternative investment-horizon 
measures classify institutional investors as short-term (i.e., transient) and long-term (i.e., 
dedicated) on the basis of portfolio turnover only.18 The three measures differ in how 
quarterly portfolio turnover is constructed, but the steps we use to classify institutions as 
either short- and long-term are the same for each measure. First, for institution i and 
quarter t, we calculate i’s portfolio turnover during calendar quarter t. Institutions in the 
top (bottom) turnover tercile of all institutions for quarter t are classified as short-term 
(long-term) for quarter t. Because an institution’s classification can change from quarter 
to quarter, we use the institution’s mode (i.e., most frequent) classification across all 
quarters as a permanent, i.e., time-invariant, classification. Use of a time-invariant 
classification for each turnover measure ensures that any observed firm-level changes in 
institutional ownership over time are driven by changes in institutions’ ownership levels 
and not by changes in their classifications. Once short- and long-term investors are 
classified, we aggregate ownership by short- and long-term investors to the firm-quarter 
level for each turnover measure. Using these three measures, we find results similar to 
those in Table 6 for both long-term and short-term institutional investors. Ownership by 
long-term investors at target firms increases significantly relative to control firms in the 
post-intervention period for two of the three measures. By comparison, ownership by 
                                                 
18 Details regarding the construction of the three portfolio turnover measures, including SAS code, are 
available at the WRDS research application, “Institutional Trades, Flows, and Turnover Ratios using 
Thomson Reuters 13-F Data,” https://wrds-
web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/research/applications/ownership/Institutional%20Trades/.  
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short-term investors decreases significantly for all three measures. These results increase 
our confidence in the institutional ownership findings reported.  
Conclusion 
In this study, we examine several types of evidence to provide insight into the 
value of shareholder activism for targeted firms. Critics of activists argue that “myopic 
activists” have a short investment horizon and seek actions that increase short-term stock 
prices at the expense of long-term shareholder value. Our study adds to a line of 
academic research that provides evidence on this allegation. We examine five types of 
evidence: market returns, analyst recommendations, short selling, institutional trading, 
and accounting results. All five types of evidence indicate that interventions by activist 
investors increase long-term shareholder value.  
We would like to comment on the relation of our study to a recent study by 
Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015). Despite substantially different samples, both studies 
find sizable positive, short-window market returns that increase in subsequent years. 
Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015) report on firm performance using Tobin’s Q and ROA 
for five years after the intervention. In several analyses, they find that target-firm, 
market undervaluation measured with Tobin’s Q declines over the subsequent years. 
They find that ROA generally improves over the five years. While Tobin’s Q has 
considerable acceptance in academe, it is based on stock market valuations, and the 
critics of activists are reluctant to accept market values as the arbiter of long-term value. 
Our study complements Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015) by examining the response of 
market participants who invest heavily in information. Despite an often substantial stock 
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price increase around the activist announcement, we find that analyst buy 
recommendations increase, short interest declines, and ownership by long-term 
(“dedicated”) institutional investors increases. A consensus therefore exists among three 
types of informed market participants that activism adds to long-term shareholder value.  
As the activist landscape continues to evolve, our results should inform 
regulators who are considering rules that may reduce incentives for activists to intervene 
at poorly performing companies. Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015) discuss how concern 
over shareholder activists is being used to oppose most policy changes that would 
strengthen shareholder influence. In addition to relevance to ongoing policy debates, our 
results should also be of interest to boards and managers as they engage with activist 
shareholders who push for changes.  
 
 64 
 
CHAPTER III 
THE ROLE OF THE BUSINESS PRESS 
IN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM CAMPAIGNS 
 
Introduction 
This study examines the role of the business press in activists’ targeting decisions 
and the effect of business press coverage on returns to activist campaign announcements. 
The business press is an important information intermediary that creates and 
disseminates information to investors, among other stakeholders (Bushee, Core, Guay, 
and Hamm 2010). Anecdotal evidence suggests that shareholder activists rely on the 
business press to announce their campaigns and to garner public support for their 
objective (Joe, Louis, and Robinson 2009). For example, in April 1992, activist Robert 
Monk took out a full-page ad in the Wall Street Journal that included an image of several 
silhouettes with the headline “The Directors of Sears, Roebuck and Co: NON-
PERFORMING ASSETS.” Under the image and title was a lengthy treatise in which 
Monk criticized the board and outlined his vision for the future of the company. 
Although Monk was unsuccessful in securing a board seat, in the months following the 
ad’s publication, the board adopted several of his recommendations (Dyck and Zingales 
2002). 
A growing body of literature has identified primarily two important roles of the 
media, namely, as creators and disseminators of information and as monitors of the firm. 
Some of the benefits of media coverage include lower information asymmetry (Bushee, 
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Core, Guay, and Hamm 2010), greater liquidity (Peress 2014), faster price formation 
(Twedt 2016; Drake, Thornock, and Twedt 2017), stronger corporate governance (Miller 
2006; Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales 2008; Dai, Parwada, and Zhang 2015), and even 
better career outcomes (Rees, Sharp, and Twedt 2014). This study bridges both streams 
of literature, informing the corporate governance role of the media through its effect on 
attracting other monitoring entities—namely, activist investors. By examining the 
market response to activist campaign announcements, the study is also linked to prior 
work that examines the media’s role in disseminating information that becomes 
impounded in stock prices.   
As the first study to provide an in-depth examination on the interaction between 
the business press and shareholder activism, I begin by providing descriptive evidence of 
media coverage around shareholder activism announcements. Using a database of 
business press articles from 2000 to 2014, I find that press coverage of firms targeted by 
activists increases 249% on the day of the activism announcement, relative to coverage 
one week earlier. I find that both favorable and unfavorable coverage increase on the 
announcement date, but the increase in favorable coverage is significantly larger (275% 
vs. 86%). Consistent with a relatively larger increase in the number of positive articles, I 
find that the average level of sentiment (measured from 0 to 100) increases 
approximately 8%, from 53.01 the week before the announcement to 57.18 on the 
announcement date. I also examine long-window changes in media coverage before and 
after activist interventions. I find that press coverage increases in the months leading up 
to an activist campaign announcement and is highest in the month of the activist 
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campaign announcement (51% higher than the same month one year earlier). Coverage 
begins to decline in the month after the announcement month but remains elevated above 
pre-intervention levels until approximately 9 months after the announcement. Favorable 
(unfavorable) news coverage increases 35% (36%) in the month of the announcement 
relative to the same month one year earlier. These results confirm the newsworthiness of 
activist campaigns and are consistent with the perception shared by other market 
participants (e.g., analysts, short sellers, and institutional investors) that activism 
campaigns are generally beneficial for target firms.  
In light of the descriptive evidence that media coverage increases in the months 
prior to an activist campaign announcement and prior theory on the determinants of 
shareholder intervention, I next examine in a multivariate setting whether media 
coverage and various attributes of media coverage influence the likelihood that a firm is 
targeted by an activist. I find consistent evidence that higher media coverage is 
positively associated with the likelihood of being targeted by an activist. In addition, 
using a measure of the favorability of the coverage, I find consistent evidence that the 
relation is larger for negative media coverage than it is for positive media coverage. I 
also find that broad dissemination of information has a bigger impact on the likelihood 
of being targeted than does the quantity of information, consistent with results from 
Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm (2010). 
I next examine one possible explanation for the observed relation between media 
coverage and the likelihood of being targeted by an activist. If media coverage is sticky, 
activists may target firms with high levels of pre-intervention media coverage to increase 
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the likelihood that their campaign receives coverage. Hence, in my next analysis, I 
identify a number of firm characteristics that are associated with the likelihood of an 
activist campaign announcement receiving media coverage. Among other associations, I 
find that pre-intervention news coverage is positively associated with the likelihood of a 
campaign receiving news coverage, and, consistent with the results for activists’ 
targeting decisions, I find that pre-intervention breadth of dissemination is more 
important than quantity of information. I draw similar inferences when using the number 
of articles as the dependent variable. 
Activists should only seek media coverage of an activist campaign 
announcement to the extent that such coverage conveys a benefit to the activist. 
Accordingly, in my final analysis, I examine the potential capital market benefits of a 
campaign announcement receiving media coverage. Specifically, I use the likelihood 
model above to generate a propensity-score matched sample of campaign 
announcements that receive business press coverage and a sample of announcements 
with similar observable characteristics that do not receive coverage. Holding other 
factors constant, I find that two-day, cumulative abnormal returns for campaign 
announcements that receive business press coverage are 1.88% higher than those that do 
not, which is more than double the average two-day return for firms without coverage 
(1.34%). Consistent with earlier results, I find strong evidence that breadth of 
information dissemination also impacts announcement returns: a one-unit increase in the 
number of sources covering a campaign is associated with a 1.61% higher announcement 
return.  
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This study makes several contributions. First, the study is, to my knowledge, the 
first to empirically investigate how business press coverage changes around shareholder 
activism campaigns. Although a casual reading of the Wall Street Journal suggests that 
shareholder activism is a topic of considerable interest to the public, there is little 
empirical evidence regarding the level of media interest around activist campaign 
announcements in either the short- or long-term. This study is also the first to provide 
insight into the factors that influence the likelihood and level of media coverage of an 
activist campaign. Given the capital market benefits of media coverage that I document, 
understanding the factors that influence media coverage should be of interest to 
shareholder activists as they attempt to maximize media exposure to their interventions. 
Finally, I contribute to prior work that examines how information dissemination by the 
media impacts capital markets. Consistent with prior work in other settings, I show that 
breadth of information dissemination around activism campaign announcements is 
equally if not more important than quantity of information generated by the business 
press.  
Hypothesis Development 
The Choice to Intervene 
When a firm performs poorly, equity holders face one of two choices: (1) they 
can intervene to take corrective action or (2) they can liquidate their position—i.e., “vote 
with their feet” (or threaten to do so). A number of theoretical studies examine the 
optimal conditions for each of these choices (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Maug 
1998; Edmans 2009; Edmans and Manso 2011). Theory developed by Kahn and Winton 
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(1998) makes two predictions that are relevant to the potential effect of media coverage 
on shareholder activism intervention. First, Kahn and Winton (1998) predict that 
institutions will only intervene in target firms to improve firm performance if (1) they 
understand the target’s industry and (2) the market understands the target’s information 
environment such that it can quickly ascertain the benefits of the institution’s 
interventions. Thus, they hypothesize, an activist’s portfolio will tend to concentrate in 
those industries and firms that are relatively transparent, as opposed to opaque firms or 
industries (e.g., high tech) where information is more difficult for both the institution 
and the market to obtain and in which the effects of an institution’s intervention for firm 
value are difficult for the market to interpret. Given the significant costs incurred during 
activist campaigns (Gantchev 2013), which are most often recouped entirely through 
share price appreciation, the resolution of and timely market response to the activist’s 
intervention is of considerable importance (Cheffins and Armour 2011). 
The second prediction from Kahn and Winton (1998) is that the likelihood of 
intervention depends on market expectations prior to the activist’s targeting decision. 
Intervention will be most profitable (and, hence, most likely) at firms that are publicly 
perceived as poor performers and least profitable at firms that are perceived as good 
performers. Intervention in the former case revises the market’s beliefs, whereas 
intervention in the latter case only confirms the market’s expectations. As I argue in the 
next section, business press coverage is an important mechanism through which 
information is disseminated to capital markets, and as such, variation in coverage may 
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affect the market’s understanding of firms’ information environments as well as their 
perceptions of the firms’ future prospects.  
The Impact of Media Coverage on the Choice to Intervene 
 A large body of research examines the role of the media in creating and 
disseminating information to capital market participants. One of the earliest studies to 
provide evidence of the value of the media for price formation is Davies and Cane 
(1978). The study examines the market response to secondary dissemination of stock 
analysts’ recommendations following earlier dissemination to the analysts’ clients. The 
authors find that, inconsistent with the strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
prices do not adjust fully to the information in the stock recommendations until 
published publicly in the Wall Street Journal. Huberman and Regev (2001) study an 
article published in the 1998 New York Times Sunday edition, which discussed potential 
cancer-treatment drugs under development by the pharmaceutical company EntreMed. 
Between Friday close and the Monday morning after the article was published, the price 
of EntreMed stock rose 700%. The stock reaction occurred despite the fact that all the 
information in the article had been published five months earlier in the journal Nature 
and other media outlets. These studies indicate that media coverage can reduce market 
frictions that prevent even public information from being impounded into stock prices 
immediately. More recent studies have confirmed in a variety of settings that media 
coverage is associated with faster price formation and reduced information asymmetry 
around important information events—e.g., earnings announcements (Bushee, Core, 
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Guay, and Hamm 2010), management’s disclosure of earnings guidance (Twedt 2016), 
and insider trading disclosure (Rogers, Skinner, and Zechman 2016).  
 Kahn and Winton (1998) predict that intervention will be more likely in 
industries that are well understood by outsiders and at firms with robust information 
environments. Given the role of the media as an important information intermediary, I 
hypothesize that shareholder activists will be attracted to firms with greater levels of 
business coverage because higher levels of coverage help activists and other outside 
investors understand the implications of the activism campaign for firm’s prospects. This 
relation is not guaranteed, however. If greater media coverage results in a more robust 
information environment, the information advantage enjoyed by privately informed 
traders, including the activist, may be reduced (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). To the 
extent that a robust information environment preempts private-information gathering, 
activists may actually choose to target firms with low levels of media coverage. Given 
these competing predictions, I state my first hypothesis in the null: 
H1: The likelihood of an activist intervention is unrelated to a firm’s business 
press coverage. 
One implication from Kahn and Winton’s (1998) second prediction is that 
intervention is most likely for firms that are perceived poorly by the public. For these 
firms, “intervening pushes the firm’s return in the unexpected direction, which tends to 
increase the institution’s trading profits” (p.100). In contrast, intervening at a firm where 
market expectations are strong only reaffirms investors beliefs and so may not result in 
significant share price appreciation. Prior research (e.g., Fang and Peress 2009; Tetlock 
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2011; Lee, Hutton, and Shu 2015; Twedt 2016) indicates that media coverage has a 
significant impact on market expectations, even controlling for the information conveyed 
by such coverage. Accordingly, activists may be attracted to firms with negative media 
coverage if such coverage media coverage dampens market expectations about firms’ 
future prospects. This prediction comprises my second hypothesis, stated in the 
alternative: 
H2: The likelihood of an activist intervention is inversely related to the 
favorability of recent business press coverage. 
 To the extent that business press coverage increases the attention that firms 
receive, high levels of past coverage may be positively associated with current press 
coverage. In my setting, activists may target firms with high press coverage because 
press coverage prior to an activist campaign announcement may increase the likelihood 
that the campaign receives media coverage when it is announced. This prediction forms 
the basis for my next hypothesis, stated in the alternative: 
H3: The likelihood that an activist campaign announcement receives business 
press coverage is positively related to the firm’s prior level of press coverage. 
  Activists should only target firms with high media coverage if such coverage 
conveys benefits to the activist. One benefit of press coverage of an activism campaign 
may be a larger initial market reaction to the campaign announcement. Indeed, Twedt 
(2016) finds that the initial market reaction to the disclosure of management earnings 
guidance is stronger for disclosures that are covered in the business press. Drake, 
Thornock, and Twedt (2017) find similar results when examining the effect of coverage 
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by professional and semi-professional internet media outlets on the market reaction to 
earnings news. This leads to my final hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
H4: The initial market reaction to an activism campaign announcement is larger 
for campaigns that receive business press coverage.  
Sources of Data 
Activist Data 
I gather information related to activist campaigns from Thomson One and 
SharkRepellant. Published by FactSet, SharkRepellant offers data on activist campaigns 
from the 1980s to the present. I obtained a one-time download, which includes data for 
campaigns through early 2013. For Thomson One, published by Thomson Reuters, 
coverage begin in 2000 and continues to the present. From these two datasets, I obtain 
the date of the activism announcement, the activist’s status as prominent or not, and the 
activist’s campaign objective. I eliminate duplicate observations resulting from overlap 
between the two datasets, which results in a final dataset of 4871 activist campaigns 
covering 2652 unique firms. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process.  
I group campaigns into six non-mutually exclusive categories according to the 
activist’s initial demand(s) as classified by Thomson One and SharkRepellant. The six 
categories include events related to corporate governance, strategy, engaging 
management, board composition, pushing for a sale, and other miscellaneous campaigns. 
Descriptions of the types of events classified in each group are presented in Appendix B.   
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Business Press Data 
 Partnering with Dow Jones, RavenPack provides real-time textual analysis of the 
Dow Jones news archive beginning in 2000, including coverage of articles published by 
the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, MarketWatch, and Dow Jones Newswires. Examples 
of available data items include the category of event covered in the article, the 
companies discussed in the article and their relevance to the article, and the novelty of 
the story. A number of recent studies have used the RavenPack database to investigate a 
wide variety of research topics, including how auditors respond to business press 
coverage (Penn 2012), how news dissemination in the business press is biased toward 
bad news (Green, Hand, and Penn 2012), and how variation in news dissemination 
differentially influences the market’s response to management earnings guidance (Twedt 
2016). 
Other Data 
 I obtain data related to firm fundamentals and other firm characteristics from 
Compustat. Stock market data is provided by CRSP. Institutional ownership is reported 
quarterly and obtained from Thomson Reuters, and analyst coverage is calculated using 
I/B/E/S. See Appendix A for a detailed description of each variable used in the analyses.  
Research Design and Variable Measurement 
Factors Influencing the Likelihood of an Activist Intervention 
To examine whether press coverage influences the likelihood of an activist 
intervention (H1 and H2), I use logistic regression to estimate the following model to 
predict shareholder activism in year t (firm subscripts omitted for clarity). The regression 
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uses all firms with available data and uses information in fiscal year t-1 to predict 
activism events in fiscal year t: 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1[𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠]𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡−1 
+𝛽5𝐷𝑖𝑣_𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸 
(5) 
Press refers to various permutations of the following press-related variables, which I 
posit may influence the likelihood of an activist intervention: the total number of articles 
published in year t-1 (N_Articles), the total number of articles with non-neutral 
sentiment (N_Articles_No50), the number of positive articles (N_Pos), the number of 
negative articles (N_Neg), the number of very positive articles (N_VeryPos), and the 
number of very negative articles (N_VeryNeg).19 As an alternative to using counts of 
positive and negative articles to examine the differential effects of positive and negative 
press coverage, I also use the average sentiment level of all articles (Av_ESS) and the 
average sentiment level of all non-neutral articles (Av_ESS_No50). Event Sentiment 
Score (ESS) is a proprietary measure of sentiment ranging in values of 0 to 100, with 
higher numbers reflecting more favorable sentiment based on the economic implications 
of the event being discussed in the article. Articles with an ESS score of 50 are 
considered neutral in sentiment. My final press-related variable used to predict activism 
is the number of unique news sources providing press coverage (N_Sources). At the 
                                                 
19 As recommended by RavenPack, all the news-related variables I construct only include articles with 
relevance (measured from 0 to 100) greater than 75 in order to ensure that the articles are significantly 
relevant to the firm. 
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construct level, article-based variables capture the amount of positive, negative, and total 
press coverage, whereas N_Sources captures the breadth of dissemination of press 
coverage (similar to Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm 2010).  
All the other independent variables have been shown in prior literature to be 
associated with the likelihood of an activist intervention. LSize is the natural logarithm 
of the firm’s market capitalization at the end of year t-1. BHAR represents the buy-and-
hold abnormal return for firm i, measured as the buy-and-hold raw return less the buy-
and-hold, value-weighted market return over year t-1. Leverage is firm i’s debt at the 
end of year t-1, scaled by end-of-year assets. Div_Yield is firm i’s dividend yield in year 
t-1, calculated as follows: (preferred dividends + common dividends)/(market value of 
common stock + book value of preferred stock). ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization, scaled by beginning-of-year assets (i.e., assets at the end 
of year t-2). Growth is firm i’s sales growth from year t-2 to year t-1. Analyst represents 
analyst following and is defined as the number of analysts who make either a quarterly 
or annual earnings forecast during fiscal year t-1. Inst denotes average institutional 
ownership across the four quarters during the fiscal year t-1. Liquidity is a measure of 
trading liquidity derived from Amihud (2002). I also include year and industry fixed 
effects to control for industry- and time-differences in the likelihood of being targeted by 
an activist.  
 If press coverage increases the likelihood of being targeted by an activist, I 
expect the coefficient on N_Articles and N_Articles_No50 to be positive. If activists are 
particularly attracted to firms with negative media coverage, I expect (1) the coefficient 
 77 
 
on N_Neg and N_VeryNeg to be positive and significantly different from the coefficients 
on N_Pos and N_VeryPos and (2) the coefficient on Av_ESS and Av_ESS_No50 to be 
negative. If breadth of press coverage influences activists’ targeting decisions, I expect 
the coefficient on N_Sources to be positive. 
Factors Influencing the Likelihood of an Announcement Receiving Press Coverage 
I use logistic regression to estimate the following model to identify factors that 
are associated with the likelihood of an activism campaign announcement receiving 
press coverage: 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠_𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁_𝐴𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠_𝑃𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝛽2𝑁_𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠_𝑃𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 
+𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑃1500 +  𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
+𝛽7𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐴𝑅_𝑃𝑟𝑒30 + 𝛽9−14[𝐴𝑐𝑡_𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠] 
+𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸 + 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀 
(6) 
The dependent variable, News_Cover, is equal to one for interventions that 
receive press coverage on the campaign announcement date. Unlike other events such as 
earnings announcements or management guidance announcements, RavenPack does not 
have a category that identifies coverage related to activism campaign announcements. 
Consequently, to identify activism campaigns that receive press coverage, I classify an 
activism campaign as receiving coverage (News_Cover) if the total number of news 
articles on the date of the activism announcement is greater than the daily average 
number of articles from days [-30, -1] relative to the announcement date. To the extent 
that my measure misclassifies firms, I should not find significant results. I also estimate 
Equation 6 with a negative binomial regression using the number of articles published on 
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the announcement date (N_Articles_Annc) as an alternative dependent variable. The 
independent variables of interest that I use to predict press coverage of activist events 
include the number of articles published in the 30 days leading up to the campaign 
announcement (N_Articles_PMonth) and the number of unique sources of coverage over 
the same time period (N_Sources_PMonth). If prior levels or breadth of press coverage 
is positively associated with coverage of an activist campaign announcement, I expect 
the coefficients on N_Articles_PMonth and N_Sources_PMonth to be positive. 
I include several other measures that may reasonably be associated with the 
likelihood that a campaign receives press coverage. Prominent is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 for campaigns launched by a prominent activist as classified by Thomson 
One and SharkRepellant. SP1500 is an indicator equal to 1 if the target firm’s stock is 
part of the S&P Composite 1500 because these firms are of primary interest to the 
business press (Li, Ramesh, and Shen 2011). I include institutional ownership (Inst), 
firm size (LSize), and analyst following to proxy for the market demand for firm 
information (Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm 2010; Twedt 2016). I also include the 
cumulative abnormal return over the trading-day period [-31, -2] relative to the activism 
announcement (CAR_Pre30) to capture prior performance and to proxy for the perceived 
impact or “newsworthiness” of the activist intervening at the firm (Kahn and Winton 
1998). I include indicator variables for the various categories of activism to control for 
the possibility that certain types of activism are of greater interest to the press than 
others. Finally, because press coverage varies across industry and time (see Figures 7 
and 8), I also include year, industry, and weekday fixed effects.   
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The Effect of Business Press Coverage on the Market Response to Activism 
Announcements 
In my final analysis, I estimate the following model to investigate how the initial 
market reaction to activism announcements differs for campaigns that receive press 
coverage compared to those that do not: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅_𝐸𝑣𝑡2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1[𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠] + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
+𝛽5𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑅_𝑃𝑟𝑒30 + 𝛽7−12[𝐴𝑐𝑡_𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠] 
+𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸 + 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀 
(7) 
The dependent variable in the model, CAR_Evt2, is the cumulative abnormal return over 
the two-day period beginning on the day of the announcement. The abnormal return for 
firm i on day t is calculated as the firm’s raw return on day t less the value-weighted 
market return on day t. Press refers to three variables that capture the effect of press 
coverage of the campaign announcement on announcement returns: News_Cover, 
N_Articles_Annc, and N_Sources_Annc (the number of unique sources providing 
coverage on the announcement day). If investors give greater attention to activist 
campaign announcements that receive press coverage, I expect to find significantly 
positive coefficients on the three press-related variables above. To reduce concerns 
about possible reverse causality—i.e., the newsworthiness of higher returns leading to 
higher same-day news coverage—I exclude any article that is categorized as relating to a 
rise or decline in share price in calculating the independent variables of interest.20  
                                                 
20 The specific category names in RavenPack are “stock-gain” and “stock-loss”. 
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Results 
Descriptive Evidence on Differences between Target and Non-Target Firms 
As the first study to examine press coverage around activism campaigns, I begin 
by graphing short-window business press coverage (Figure 7) and long-window business 
press coverage around activism announcements. Panel A of Figure 7 depicts the average 
daily number of articles published in the month before and after the activist’s campaign 
announcement. Two aspects of Panel A deserve mention: First, there is a noticeable 
weekly time trend in press coverage, underscoring the importance of using weekday 
fixed effects to control for day-of-the-week variation in press coverage. Second, and 
more importantly, there is a large spike in the number of articles on the date of the 
activism announcement representing an increase of 249%, relative to the same day a 
week earlier. Panel B shows that this spike is concentrated in favorable news coverage: 
the number of articles exhibiting positive sentiment increases 275%, whereas the number 
of articles with negative sentiment increases 82%. This result is confirmed in Panel C, 
which graphs the average sentiment level of all articles. It increases from 53.01 on the 
same day one week earlier to 57.18 on the announcement date, an increase of 
approximately 8%. These results confirm the newsworthiness of activist campaigns and 
are consistent with the perception shared by other market participants (e.g., analysts, 
short sellers, and institutional investors) that the business press generally views activism 
campaigns as beneficial for target firms. 
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Figure 7. Short-Window Business Press Coverage around Activism Announcements 
Panel A: Average Daily Number of Articles 
 
 
Panel B: Average Daily Number of Positive and Negative Articles 
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Figure 7 Continued 
Panel C: Average Daily Sentiment Score (ESS) for All Articles 
 
This figure plots variation in media coverage in the [-30, 30] day window surrounding an activist 
campaign announcement. Panel A plots the average daily number of articles across all news sources in the 
RavenPack database. Panel B plots the average daily number of favorable and unfavorable press articles, 
where favorable (unfavorable) articles are those with an ESS score greater than (less than) 50. Panel C 
plots the average daily ESS score of all articles for the target firms. 
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Figure 8 depicts business press coverage in the two years before and after an 
activism campaign announcement. Panel A shows significant variation in press coverage 
in the year before and after an activist campaign announcement. Press coverage 
increases in the months leading up to an activist campaign announcement and is highest 
in the month of the activist campaign announcement (51% higher than the same month 
one year earlier). Coverage begins to decline in the month after the announcement month 
but remains elevated above pre-intervention levels until approximately 9 months after 
the announcement. Panel B shows that favorable (unfavorable) news coverage increases 
35% (36%) in the month of the announcement relative to the same month one year 
earlier. Thus, although positive press coverage is higher in the day of the activism 
announcement (Figure 7, Panel B), the difference is attenuated when aggregating at 
larger time intervals. Despite the relative increase in the number of positive and negative 
articles being almost identical, there is still a noticeable spike in sentiment when 
averaged across all articles (Panel C). This suggests that, while the number of positive 
and negative articles may increase at the same rate, the tone in articles becomes more 
positive (or less negative) in the month of an activist campaign announcement and the 
two months after. These results suggest that activism campaigns have effects on media 
coverage that persist for several weeks beyond the initial campaign announcement.  
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Figure 8. Long-Window Business Press Coverage around Activism Announcements 
Panel A: Average Monthly Number of Articles  
 
 
Panel B: Average Monthly Number of Positive and Negative Articles 
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Figure 8 Continued 
Panel C: Average Monthly Sentiment Score (ESS) for All Articles 
 
This figure plots variation in media coverage in the two years before and after an activist campaign 
announcement. Panel A plots the average monthly number of articles across all news sources in the 
RavenPack database. Panel B plots the average monthly number of favorable and unfavorable press 
articles, where favorable (unfavorable) articles are those with an ESS score greater than (less than) 50. 
Panel C plots the average monthly ESS score of all articles for the target firms. 
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Table 7 displays descriptive statistics for variables used to predict activist 
interventions (Equation 5). Panel A shows results for the pooled sample of all firms with 
available data. Activism campaigns are relatively rare, with roughly 4% of firm-years 
are subject to an activist intervention.  The large difference in means for N_Articles and 
N_Articles_No50 indicates that the large majority of business press articles neutral in 
sentiment. Indeed, variation in sentiment (Av_ESS) appears to be modest with only about 
a 12-point difference in between the 10th percentile of sentiment and the 90th (48.7 
versus 60.9). Predictably, there is more variation when excluding articles with neutral 
sentiment. Furthermore, positive press coverage is about twice as common as negative 
coverage, and this is true for very positive and negative coverage as well. Panel B 
displays differences for activist-target and non-target firm-years. Activist targets are 
significantly different from the universe of all firms along almost all dimensions, 
underscoring the importance of controlling for differences when comparing target and 
non-target firms. Univariate tests of differences in press coverage suggest that activist 
targets receive much more press coverage than non-target firms, and this is true for both 
positive and negative press coverage. Sentiment of press coverage is lower for activist 
targets compared to control firms, which supports the possibility that activists 
deliberately target firms with negative press coverage.   
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used to Predict Activist Interventions 
Panel A: Pooled Sample Statistics 
Variables Mean 
Std.  
Dev. 10th 25th Median 75th 90th 
        
Activist 0.041 0.199 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N_Articles 127.048 467.239 0.000 13.000 68.000 133.000 232.000 
N_Articles_No50 35.567 60.360 0.000 4.000 21.000 45.000 79.000 
N_Sources 1.240 1.039 0.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 
N_Pos 24.323 42.774 0.000 2.000 14.000 30.000 54.000 
N_Neg 11.244 20.417 0.000 0.000 6.000 15.000 27.000 
N_VeryPos 3.453 6.083 0.000 0.000 1.000 5.000 9.000 
N_VeryNeg 1.683 5.608 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 5.000 
Av_ESS 54.757 5.125 48.679 51.731 54.680 57.796 60.873 
Av_ESS_No50 57.088 7.445 47.926 52.754 57.240 61.890 66.217 
LSize 5.955 2.192 3.131 4.351 5.908 7.451 8.937 
BHAR 0.064 0.573 -0.516 -0.271 -0.023 0.259 0.665 
Lev 0.558 0.359 0.176 0.323 0.538 0.766 0.914 
Div_Yield 0.015 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.042 
ROA 0.049 0.339 -0.132 0.018 0.087 0.162 0.251 
Growth 0.193 0.757 -0.188 -0.039 0.073 0.220 0.499 
Analyst 7.543 8.748 0.000 1.000 5.000 11.000 20.000 
Inst 0.402 0.333 0.000 0.059 0.366 0.711 0.873 
Liquidity -0.495 0.926 -1.389 -0.492 -0.126 -0.040 -0.017 
 88 
 
Table 7 Continued 
Panel B: Subsample Comparison for Activist Targets and Non-Targets 
 Non-Targets  Targets  
Variables N Mean  N Mean MeanDiff 
       
N_Articles 72,987 122.302  3129 237.749 -115.447*** 
N_Articles_No50 72,987 34.439  3129 61.883 -27.444*** 
N_Sources 72,987 1.228  3129 1.513 -0.285*** 
N_Pos 72,987 23.579  3129 41.674 -18.095*** 
N_Neg 72,987 10.86  3129 20.208 -9.349*** 
N_VeryPos 72,987 3.374  3129 5.283 -1.909*** 
N_VeryNeg 72,987 1.572  3129 4.27 -2.698*** 
Av_ESS 55,689 54.802  2712 53.836 0.966*** 
Av_ESS_No50 55,422 57.15  2702 55.817 1.333*** 
LSize 72,987 5.957  3129 5.908 0.050 
BHAR 72,987 0.068  3129 -0.035 0.103*** 
Lev 72,987 0.558  3129 0.554 0.004 
Div_Yield 72,987 0.015  3129 0.012 0.003*** 
ROA 72,987 0.048  3129 0.072 -0.024*** 
Growth 72,987 0.197  3129 0.114 0.082*** 
Analyst 72,987 7.502  3129 8.494 -0.992*** 
Inst 72,987 0.396  3129 0.536 -0.140*** 
Liquidity 72,987 -0.499  3129 -0.392 -0.107*** 
This sample is composed of the universe of firms with available annual data and is used to estimate 
Equation 5. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the pooled sample of targeted and non-targeted 
firms. Panel B presents a comparison in descriptive statistics for subsamples of targeted and non-
targeted firms. 
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, with two-
tailed p-values. 
 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Descriptive Evidence on Differences between Covered and Non-Covered Campaigns 
Table 8, Panel A displays descriptive campaign-related statistics for the full 
sample of activist campaigns, and Panel B displays statistics separately for activist 
campaign announcements that receive press coverage and those that do not. 
Approximately half of campaigns receive press coverage on the announcement date, and 
Panel B shows that firms receiving coverage are different from those that do not in many 
ways. Covered firms have more press coverage both before and on the day of the 
activism announcement.21 Pre-announcement breadth of press coverage is also larger for 
targets with covered campaign announcements. There are also significant differences in 
the types of campaigns that receive coverage. Campaigns related to corporate strategy 
and campaigns seeking a sale of the company are most likely to be covered by the press. 
Consistent with my hypothesis, the univariate difference in the market reaction to 
covered and non-covered campaign announcements is significant—3.7% for covered 
announcements and 1.5% for non-covered announcements. 
  
                                                 
21 Recall that News_Cover is equal to 0 if the number of articles on the announcement date is less than the 
daily average number over the prior 30 days. A firm can have non-zero press coverage and still be 
classified as not receiving coverage, which explains why the mean N_Articles_Annc is not zero for non-
covered firms.  
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Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Activist Campaigns 
Panel A: Statistics for the Pooled Sample of Activism Campaigns 
Variables Mean 
Std.  
Dev. 10th 25th Median 75th 90th 
        
News_Cover 0.511 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
N_Articles_Annc 3.645 9.086 0.000 0.000 1.000 4.000 9.000 
N_Articles_PMonth 15.178 19.873 0.000 1.000 8.000 20.000 43.000 
N_Sources_Annc 0.654 0.733 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
N_Sources_PMonth 1.077 0.917 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 
CAR_Evt2 0.026 0.087 -0.033 -0.009 0.010 0.040 0.100 
Prominent 0.426 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SP1500 0.150 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Inst 0.483 0.332 0.000 0.165 0.515 0.778 0.914 
LSize 5.763 1.987 3.379 4.250 5.516 7.100 8.752 
Analyst 7.377 9.652 0.000 0.000 4.000 10.000 21.000 
CAR_Pre30 0.013 0.176 -0.181 -0.071 0.009 0.104 0.246 
Engage 0.415 0.493 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Board 0.390 0.488 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Corp_Gov 0.150 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Strategy 0.092 0.289 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sale 0.085 0.279 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other 0.116 0.320 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
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Table 8 Continued 
Panel B: Subsample Comparison for Campaigns with and without Press Coverage 
 No Coverage  Coverage  
Variables N Mean  N Mean MeanDiff 
       
N_Articles_Annc 2094 0.204  2187 6.94 -6.736*** 
N_Articles_PMonth 2094 11.298  2187 18.894 -7.596*** 
N_Sources_Annc 2094 0.085  2187 1.199 -1.114*** 
N_Sources_PMonth 2094 0.832  2187 1.311 -0.479*** 
CAR_Evt2 2045 0.015  2167 0.037 -0.021*** 
Prominent 2094 0.443  2187 0.409 0.033** 
SP1500 2094 0.101  2187 0.197 -0.096*** 
Inst 2094 0.374  2187 0.587 -0.213*** 
LSize 1928 5.402  2133 6.089 -0.687*** 
Analyst 2094 5.853  2187 8.837 -2.984*** 
CAR_Pre30 2048 0.020  2168 0.006 0.014*** 
Engage 2094 0.400  2187 0.43 -0.030** 
Board 2094 0.396  2187 0.383 0.0130 
Corp_Gov 2094 0.162  2187 0.139 0.022** 
Strategy 2094 0.075  2187 0.109 -0.034*** 
Sale 2094 0.065  2187 0.104 -0.039*** 
Other 2094 0.141  2187 0.091 0.049*** 
This sample is comprised of all activist campaigns with available data and is used to estimate Equations 
6 and 7. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for all activist campaign announcements. Panel B 
presents a comparison between covered and non-covered campaign announcements. 
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, with two-
tailed p-values. 
 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Given the significant differences between campaigns that receive coverage and 
those that do not, I use propensity-score matching (PSM) to identify subsamples of 
covered campaigns and campaigns that do not receive press coverage but which are 
similar to covered firms in other observable respects.  I use this PSM sample in 
subsequent multivariate analyses to compare the effect of differences in press coverage 
on the market reaction to activist campaign announcements. For each hypothesis, I now 
discuss results from multivariate analyses. 
Press Coverage and the Likelihood of Intervention (H1) 
Results from estimating the relation between press coverage and the likelihood of 
being targeted by an activist investor are displayed in Table 9. In Panel A, I use press 
coverage variables that includes both neutral and non-neutral articles. In Panel B, I 
report estimates for the same models using press coverage variables that exclude neutral 
articles.  
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Table 9. Press Coverage and the Likelihood of Being Targeted by an Activist 
Panel A: Coverage Variables Including Neutral Articles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var = Activist 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) Odds Ratio 
N_Articlest-1 0.000192**  0.000173** 1.000** 
 (7.83e-05)  (7.27e-05) (7.27e-05) 
N_Sourcest-1  0.156*** 0.136*** 1.146*** 
  (0.0244) (0.0251) (0.0288) 
LSizet-1 -0.218*** -0.219*** -0.230*** 0.795*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0177) 
BHARt-1 -0.178*** -0.180*** -0.175*** 0.839*** 
 (0.0426) (0.0424) (0.0423) (0.0355) 
Levt-1 0.109** 0.0895* 0.0886* 1.093* 
 (0.0482) (0.0501) (0.0501) (0.0548) 
Div_Yieldt-1 -0.879 -0.986 -1.031 0.357 
 (0.829) (0.824) (0.830) (0.296) 
ROAt-1 0.289*** 0.314*** 0.322*** 1.380*** 
 (0.106) (0.108) (0.108) (0.149) 
Growtht-1 -0.159*** -0.159*** -0.156*** 0.855*** 
 (0.0485) (0.0480) (0.0477) (0.0408) 
Analystt-1 0.0138*** 0.0108** 0.00962** 1.010** 
 (0.00431) (0.00446) (0.00442) (0.00447) 
Instt-1 1.135*** 0.998*** 1.022*** 2.778*** 
 (0.0875) (0.0930) (0.0922) (0.256) 
Liquidityt-1 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.146*** 1.157*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0372) (0.0375) (0.0434) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
N 76,116 76,116 76,116 76,116 
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Area under the ROC 
Curve 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.74 
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Table 9 Continued 
Panel B: Coverage Variables Excluding Neutral Articles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var = Activist 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) Odds Ratio 
N_Articles_No50t-1 0.00417***  0.00399*** 1.004*** 
 (0.000422)  (0.000426) (0.000428) 
N_Sourcest-1  0.156*** 0.0667** 1.069** 
  (0.0244) (0.0272) (0.0291) 
LSizet-1 -0.263*** -0.219*** -0.268*** 0.765*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0222) (0.0225) (0.0172) 
BHARt-1 -0.152*** -0.180*** -0.151*** 0.860*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0424) (0.0414) (0.0356) 
Levt-1 0.0585 0.0895* 0.0487 1.050 
 (0.0541) (0.0501) (0.0550) (0.0578) 
Div_Yieldt-1 -1.369 -0.986 -1.419* 0.242* 
 (0.853) (0.824) (0.852) (0.206) 
ROAt-1 0.356*** 0.314*** 0.370*** 1.447*** 
 (0.111) (0.108) (0.112) (0.162) 
Growtht-1 -0.144*** -0.159*** -0.144*** 0.866*** 
 (0.0464) (0.0480) (0.0461) (0.0399) 
Analystt-1 0.00199 0.0108** 0.000408 1.000 
 (0.00441) (0.00446) (0.00445) (0.00445) 
Instt-1 1.154*** 0.998*** 1.102*** 3.010*** 
 (0.0894) (0.0930) (0.0918) (0.276) 
Liquidityt-1 0.180*** 0.136*** 0.183*** 1.201*** 
 (0.0388) (0.0372) (0.0387) (0.0465) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
N 76,116 76,116 76,116 76,116 
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Area under the ROC 
Curve 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation 5 with various proxies for the amount of news 
coverage as the primary independent variables of interest. Panel A (B) estimates the relation between 
press coverage and the likelihood of intervention using all available (non-neutral) articles.  
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, with two-
tailed p-values, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the firm-level. 
 
Appendix A provides variable definitions. 
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The independent variable of interest in Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A are, N_Articles and 
N_Sources, respectively. The significantly positive coefficient on N_Articles suggests 
that activists target firms with higher press coverage. The significantly positive 
coefficient on N_Sources indicates that activists target firms with greater breadth of 
coverage as well. Column 3 includes both variables in the model, and the odds ratio for 
the Column 3 model are displayed in Column 4. Although both variables remain 
significant, the odds ratio for N_Articles is not economically meaningful. In contrast, the 
odds ratio for N_Sources indicates that a one-unit increase in the number of sources 
providing coverage for the firm increase the odds of being targeted by an activist almost 
15%. I find consistent results when limiting the sample of articles to those with non-
neutral sentiment (Panel B). These results indicate that press coverage influences 
activists targeting decisions, and breadth of press coverage is more important for their 
decision than the amount of press coverage.  
Favorability of Press Coverage and the Likelihood of Intervention (H2) 
 Results from estimating the relation between the favorability of press coverage 
and the likelihood of being targeted by an activist investor are displayed in Table 10. In 
Panel A, I use counts of positive and negative articles as my primary independent 
variables, and I use sentiment scores in Panel B. Column 1 uses counts of all positive 
and negative variables to predict the likelihood of an intervention. The coefficients on 
both N_Pos and N_Neg are positive and statistically significant. However, a chi-squared 
test of equality of the coefficients fails to reject the null that the coefficients are equal. In 
terms of economic magnitude, a one-unit increase in the number of positive (negative) 
 96 
 
articles is associated with a 0.3% (0.5%) increase in the odds of being targeted by an 
activist. Column 3 shows that this difference between positive and negative coverage is 
more pronounced when limiting articles to those that are very positive (ESS > 75) and 
very negative (ESS < 75), and a chi-squared test rejects the null that the coefficients on 
N_VeryPos and N_VeryNeg are equal (p-value = 0.037). Odds ratios in Column 4 
indicates that a one-unit increase in the number of very positive (negative) business press 
articles is associated with a 1.4% (2.8%) increase in the odds of being targeted by an 
activist. I reach similar inferences when using article sentiment instead of article counts 
in Panel B: the odds ratio for Av_ESS (Av_ESS_No50) in Column 2 (4) indicates that a 
one-unit decrease in sentiment is associated with a 2.1% (1.5%) increase in the odds of 
being targeted by an activist. Taken together, the results in Tables 3 and 4 provide strong 
evidence that activists are most likely to intervene at firms that have received high levels 
of press coverage, especially negative coverage. 
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Table 10. Favorability of Press Coverage and the Likelihood of Being Targeted by 
an Activist  
Panel A: Using Counts of Positive and Negative Articles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var = Activist 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) Odds Ratio 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) Odds Ratio 
N_Post-1 0.00336*** 1.003***   
 (0.000699) (0.000701)   
N_Negt-1 0.00544*** 1.005***   
 (0.00187) (0.00188)   
N_VeryPost-1   0.0141*** 1.014*** 
   (0.00425) (0.00432) 
N_VeryNegt-1   0.0273*** 1.028*** 
   (0.00411) (0.00422) 
N_Sourcest-1 0.0642** 1.066** 0.0874*** 1.091*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0297) (0.0266) (0.0290) 
LSizet-1 -0.265*** 0.767*** -0.246*** 0.782*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0173) (0.0217) (0.0170) 
BHARt-1 -0.147*** 0.863*** -0.153*** 0.858*** 
 (0.0413) (0.0357) (0.0415) (0.0356) 
Levt-1 0.0464 1.048 0.0624 1.064 
 (0.0554) (0.0581) (0.0535) (0.0569) 
Div_Yieldt-1 -1.462* 0.232* -1.425* 0.240* 
 (0.855) (0.198) (0.853) (0.205) 
ROAt-1 0.376*** 1.456*** 0.358*** 1.431*** 
 (0.113) (0.164) (0.111) (0.159) 
Growtht-1 -0.142*** 0.867*** -0.146*** 0.864*** 
 (0.0459) (0.0398) (0.0463) (0.0400) 
Analystt-1 0.000306 1.000 0.00178 1.002 
 (0.00449) (0.00449) (0.00460) (0.00461) 
Instt-1 1.097*** 2.995*** 1.068*** 2.910*** 
 (0.0912) (0.273) (0.0923) (0.269) 
Liquidityt-1 0.180*** 1.198*** 0.166*** 1.181*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0463) (0.0380) (0.0449) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
N 76,116 76,116 76,116 76,116 
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Area under the ROC 
Curve 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 
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Table 10 Continued 
Panel B: Using Sentiment Scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var = Activist 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) Odds Ratio 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) Odds Ratio 
Av_ESSt-1 -0.0213*** 0.979***   
 (0.00484) (0.00474)   
Av_ESS_No50t-1   -0.0149*** 0.985*** 
   (0.00320) (0.00315) 
N_Sourcest-1 0.196*** 1.217*** 0.191*** 1.210*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0331) (0.0272) (0.0330) 
LSizet-1 -0.167*** 0.846*** -0.170*** 0.844*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0226) (0.0267) (0.0225) 
BHARt-1 -0.156*** 0.856*** -0.151*** 0.860*** 
 (0.0479) (0.0410) (0.0479) (0.0412) 
Levt-1 0.0490 1.050 0.0483 1.049 
 (0.0644) (0.0676) (0.0644) (0.0676) 
Div_Yieldt-1 -1.263 0.283 -1.210 0.298 
 (0.948) (0.268) (0.948) (0.283) 
ROAt-1 0.325** 1.385** 0.349*** 1.418*** 
 (0.129) (0.178) (0.132) (0.187) 
Growtht-1 -0.127** 0.881** -0.126** 0.882** 
 (0.0517) (0.0456) (0.0518) (0.0457) 
Analystt-1 0.00537 1.005 0.00535 1.005 
 (0.00493) (0.00495) (0.00492) (0.00495) 
Instt-1 0.829*** 2.291*** 0.828*** 2.290*** 
 (0.116) (0.266) (0.116) (0.266) 
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Table 10, Panel B Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var = Activist 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) Odds Ratio 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) Odds Ratio 
Liquidityt-1 0.0956** 1.100** 0.102** 1.107** 
 (0.0417) (0.0459) (0.0425) (0.0471) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
N 58,401 58,401 58,124 58,124 
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Area under the ROC 
Curve 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation 5 with various proxies for the favorability of news 
coverage as the primary independent variables of interest. Panel A (B) estimates the relation between 
press coverage and the likelihood of intervention using counts of positive and negative articles 
(sentiment scores).  
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, with two-
tailed p-values, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the firm-level. 
 
Appendix A provides variable definitions. 
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Prior Press Coverage and the Likelihood of Announcement Press Coverage (H3) 
 Results from estimating the relation between pre-announcement press coverage 
and campaign announcement press coverage are displayed in Table 11, Panel A. To 
investigate the channels through which prior press coverage may influence 
announcement campaign coverage, I model coverage as a function of the amount of 
prior coverage—i.e., the number of articles in the month prior to the campaign 
announcement (Column 1)—and as a function of the breadth of coverage—i.e., the 
number of unique sources that covered the target firm in the month prior to the 
intervention (Column 2). I find that both measures are positively associated with the 
likelihood of a campaign receiving coverage. However, when estimated together, the 
sign on N_Articles_PMonth is negative, and the odds ratio suggests the relation is very 
small. In contrast, the relation between breadth of coverage and announcement press 
coverage is large and highly significant: a one-unit increase in the number of sources 
providing pre-intervention coverage is associated with an 89% increase in the odds of a 
campaign receiving press coverage. Inferences are consistent when I use negative 
binomial regression to estimate the number of articles on the announcement date as a 
function of prior-month coverage variables (Column 5): a one-unit increase in the 
number of pre-intervention articles (sources) covering a target firm is associated with a 
0.004 (0.484) increase in the number of announcement day articles for the firm. Overall, 
these results indicate that pre-intervention business press coverage is positively 
associated with campaign announcement coverage, but the effect is driven primarily 
through the breadth, not the amount, of pre-intervention coverage. 
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Table 11. Prior Press Coverage and the Likelihood of an Activist Campaign Receiving Press Coverage 
Panel A: Logistic and Negative Binomial Models Predicting Press Coverage of Campaign Announcements  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
DV = 
News_Cover 
DV = 
News_Cover 
DV = 
News_Cover 
DV = 
News_Cover 
DV = 
N_Articles_Annc 
 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) Odds Ratio 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
N_Articles_PMonth 0.0138***  -0.00739** 0.993** 0.00432* 
 (0.00250)  (0.00335) (0.00332) (0.00240) 
N_Sources_PMonth  0.531*** 0.636*** 1.890*** 0.484*** 
  (0.0577) (0.0780) (0.147) (0.0536) 
Prominent -0.158** -0.156** -0.162** 0.851** -0.127** 
 (0.0773) (0.0774) (0.0774) (0.0658) (0.0589) 
SP1500 0.0413 0.0476 0.0487 1.050 0.0373 
 (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.118) (0.0703) 
Inst 1.794*** 1.660*** 1.655*** 5.235*** 0.880*** 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.789) (0.134) 
LSize -0.0126 -0.0203 -0.0110 0.989 0.0885*** 
 (0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0317) (0.0314) (0.0279) 
Analyst -0.00597 -0.0104* -0.00776 0.992 0.0111** 
 (0.00617) (0.00634) (0.00646) (0.00641) (0.00474) 
CAR_Pre30 -0.453** -0.552*** -0.549*** 0.577*** -0.386*** 
 (0.207) (0.210) (0.210) (0.121) (0.149) 
Engage 0.187* 0.196* 0.193* 1.213* -0.137* 
 (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.125) (0.0777) 
Board 0.233** 0.250*** 0.245** 1.277** 0.126* 
 (0.0954) (0.0965) (0.0968) (0.124) (0.0666) 
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Table 11, Panel A Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
DV = 
News_Cover 
DV = 
News_Cover 
DV = 
News_Cover 
DV = 
News_Cover 
DV = 
N_Articles_Annc 
 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) Odds Ratio 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Corp_Gov -0.110 -0.118 -0.114 0.892 0.0339 
 (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.0911) (0.0959) 
Strategy 0.400*** 0.395*** 0.394*** 1.483*** 0.313*** 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.135) (0.200) (0.0980) 
Sale 0.664*** 0.683*** 0.680*** 1.974*** 0.925*** 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.266) (0.0873) 
Other -0.462*** -0.492*** -0.481*** 0.618*** -0.368*** 
 (0.149) (0.153) (0.152) (0.0939) (0.111) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES  
Day-of-week Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES  
N 4,026 4,026 4,026 4,026 4,026 
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13  
Area under the ROC 
Curve 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 
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Table 11 Continued 
Panel B: Covariate Balance between Matched Pairs 
 Subsample Means  
Variable Coverage No Coverage diff. p > |t| 
N_Articles_PMonth 15.626 15.899 0.726 
N_Sources_PMonth 1.135 1.117 0.596 
Prominent 0.411 0.414 0.871 
SP1500 0.150 0.145 0.736 
Inst 0.498 0.514 0.209 
LSize 5.648 5.656 0.918 
Analyst 7.442 7.456 0.970 
CAR_Pre30 0.017 0.010 0.269 
Engage 0.416 0.433 0.397 
Board 0.377 0.374 0.869 
Corp_Gov 0.147 0.147 0.955 
Strategy 0.092 0.088 0.780 
Sale 0.088 0.075 0.216 
Other 0.112 0.116 0.754 
Number of Matched Pairs 1256   
This table presents the results of estimating Equation 6. Panel A estimates the likelihood of a campaign 
receiving press coverage (columns 1 through 4) and the number of articles on the announcement date 
(column 5). Panel B presents univariate differences between campaigns that receive coverage and a 
propensity-score matched sample of campaigns that do not receive press coverage.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, with two-
tailed p-values, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the firm-level. 
 
Appendix A provides variable definitions. 
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Business Press Coverage and the Market Response to Campaign Announcements (H4) 
 Given the significant differences between campaigns that receive business press 
coverage and those that do not (Table 8, Panel B), any difference in the market response 
to campaign announcements could be due to differences that are unrelated to media 
coverage. To mitigate this concern, I use propensity score matching to create a sample of 
covered announcements and non-covered announcements that are similar along 
observable dimensions. Using the predicted values (i.e., propensity scores) from 
estimating Equation 6, I match (without replacement) each covered campaign to the non-
covered campaign that has the closest propensity score (i.e., the “nearest neighbor”). I 
require that the difference in propensities between a target firm and its match be no 
larger than 1%. Covariate balance for the 1256 pairs of covered and non-covered 
campaigns are displayed in Table 11, Panel B. Differences between covered and non-
covered firms are statistically insignificant, suggesting that the covered and non-covered 
firms are similar along observable dimensions. The area under the ROC curve is 0.7401, 
and a goodness-of-fit test fails to reject the null, suggesting that the model fits the data 
reasonably well 
Using both the full sample of activist campaign announcements (Table 12, Panel 
A) and the PSM sample of announcements (Table 12, Panel B), I estimate the effect of 
business press coverage on the initial market response to campaign announcements. In 
Columns 1 through 3, my primary variables of interest are, respectively, an indicator for 
whether the campaign announcement received coverage, a count of the number of 
articles on the announcement date, and a count of the number of unique sources 
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reporting on the firm. When considered individually, I find a positive and economically 
significant relation between each of the press coverage measures and announcement 
returns. For example, using results for the PSM sample, receiving campaign coverage is 
associated with a 1.88% higher announcement return (Column 1), and a one-unit 
increase in the sources covering the firm is associated with a 1.61% higher 
announcement return (Column 3). When included in the same model (Column 4), 
however, only News_Cover and N_Articles_Annc remain statistically significant, and 
only the former is economically meaningful, with returns for covered announcements 
being almost 1% higher than that of non-covered announcements. This result confirms 
that business press coverage of activism campaign announcements indirectly benefits 
activists through its effect on the market response to the announcement, although it is 
unclear whether the effect is driven by the amount or breadth of coverage.  
  
 106 
 
Table 12. The Effect of Business Press Coverage on the Initial Market Response to 
Activism Campaign Announcements 
Panel A: Full Sample of Activism Campaign Announcements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. = 
CAR_Evt2 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
News_Cover 0.0166***   0.00726* 
 (0.00266)   (0.00413) 
N_Articles_Annc  0.000913***  0.000550** 
  (0.000272)  (0.000270) 
N_Sources_Annc   0.0136*** 0.00567 
   (0.00236) (0.00355) 
Prominent -0.00469* -0.00540** -0.00491** -0.00493** 
 (0.00249) (0.00251) (0.00250) (0.00251) 
Inst 0.0113** 0.0168*** 0.0135*** 0.0123** 
 (0.00488) (0.00478) (0.00473) (0.00498) 
LSize -0.00180* -0.00237** -0.00226** -0.00237** 
 (0.00108) (0.00108) (0.00109) (0.00109) 
Analyst -2.11e-05 -0.000190 -0.000282 -0.000239 
 (0.000193) (0.000197) (0.000200) (0.000203) 
CAR_Pre30 -0.0396*** -0.0397*** -0.0406*** -0.0394*** 
 (0.00995) (0.00999) (0.00991) (0.00997) 
Engage -0.00972** -0.00841* -0.00947** -0.00910** 
 (0.00446) (0.00443) (0.00443) (0.00443) 
Board -0.00783* -0.00708* -0.00758* -0.00760* 
 (0.00411) (0.00408) (0.00408) (0.00407) 
Corp_Gov -0.00890** -0.00964** -0.00967** -0.00949** 
 (0.00401) (0.00402) (0.00402) (0.00401) 
Strategy -0.00366 -0.00339 -0.00517 -0.00477 
 (0.00445) (0.00443) (0.00446) (0.00444) 
Sale 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 
 (0.00897) (0.00894) (0.00888) (0.00887) 
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Table 12, Panel A Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. = 
CAR_Evt2 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Other -0.0206*** -0.0205*** -0.0210*** -0.0200*** 
 (0.00464) (0.00465) (0.00463) (0.00464) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Day-of-week Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES 
N 4,031 4,031 4,031 4,031 
R-squared 0.172 0.172 0.174 0.177 
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Table 12 Continued 
Panel B: PSM Sample of Activism Campaign Announcements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. = 
CAR_Evt2 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
News_Cover 0.0188***   0.00912** 
 (0.00307)   (0.00449) 
N_Articles_Annc  0.00112***  0.000713* 
  (0.000377)  (0.000378) 
N_Sources_Annc   0.0161*** 0.00549 
   (0.00278) (0.00467) 
Prominent -0.00587** -0.00612** -0.00603** -0.00609** 
 (0.00291) (0.00291) (0.00291) (0.00290) 
Inst 0.00759 0.00747 0.0102* 0.00903 
 (0.00581) (0.00583) (0.00591) (0.00594) 
LSize -0.000777 -0.00152 -0.00136 -0.00149 
 (0.00140) (0.00140) (0.00140) (0.00140) 
Analyst -7.98e-05 -0.000249 -0.000419* -0.000310 
 (0.000240) (0.000242) (0.000250) (0.000257) 
CAR_Pre30 -0.0322*** -0.0297** -0.0332*** -0.0315** 
 (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0123) 
Engage -0.0131** -0.0131** -0.0130** -0.0129** 
 (0.00588) (0.00587) (0.00585) (0.00583) 
Board -0.00943* -0.00943* -0.00874* -0.00910* 
 (0.00508) (0.00505) (0.00505) (0.00503) 
Corp_Gov -0.0111** -0.0119** -0.0122** -0.0119** 
 (0.00499) (0.00498) (0.00497) (0.00493) 
Strategy -0.00740 -0.00769 -0.00827 -0.00784 
 (0.00637) (0.00630) (0.00634) (0.00628) 
Sale 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0120) 
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Table 12, Panel B Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. = 
CAR_Evt2 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Other -0.0229*** -0.0220*** -0.0231*** -0.0221*** 
 (0.00590) (0.00599) (0.00589) (0.00593) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Day-of-week Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES 
N 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 
R-squared 0.174 0.174 0.177 0.181 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation 7. Panel A presents results for all covered and 
non-covered campaigns. Panel B presents results for only propensity-score matched covered and non-
covered campaigns.  
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, with two-
tailed p-values, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the firm-level. 
 
Appendix A provides variable definitions. 
  
 110 
 
Robustness Tests 
As a robustness test, I create the same press variables using an alternative 
measure of sentiment supplied by RavenPack, Composite Sentiment Score (CSS). CSS 
combines textual characteristics of news articles with 5 other signals to create a 
composite measure of sentiment. I find that CSS exhibits less variation than ESS, and 
consequently, although the sign and significance of my tests are comparable across both 
measures, economic magnitudes are slightly smaller when using CSS. 
In addition to reducing concerns over reverse causality by excluding articles that 
are categorized as covering changes in stock price, I take other steps to mitigate 
endogeneity concerns. One possible alternative explanation for results for my returns test 
is that the relation between business press coverage and returns is driven by the 
economic implications of the campaign. That is, the economic news of the campaign 
causes both the increase in business press coverage and the stock market reaction. 
Unlike other information events (e.g., earnings announcements or management 
forecasts), there is no readily observable proxy the economic value embedded in an 
activist announcement. My analysis attempt to control for the economics of the 
intervention by controlling for the campaign objective and the prominence of the 
activists. In untabulated tests though, I also include either the one- or two-year buy-and-
hold abnormal return (starting on the announcement date) as a proxy for the economic 
value of the campaign, and I find consistent results.  
Finally, I investigate the possibility that the increased attention from business 
press coverage causes investors to initially overreact to an activist campaign 
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announcement. I substitute 6- and 11-day cumulative abnormal returns for the 2-day 
returns and find a consistently positive and significant effect of media coverage up two 
weeks after the intervention. Longer return periods cause the media coverage (and other) 
variables to lose significance but not to flip sign. This suggests that markets do not 
correct to a potential overreaction to covered campaign announcements. 
Conclusion 
In this study, I examine the role of the business press in activists’ targeting 
decisions and in its effect on the market reaction to activist campaign announcements. I 
find that activists are most likely to target firms with high levels of total media coverage, 
consistent with Kahn and Winton’s (1998) theory, which predicts that activists will 
target highly visible, well understood firms. In addition, I find that the favorableness of 
business press coverage is inversely related to the likelihood of being targeted by an 
activist, consistent with Kahan and Winton’s (1998) prediction that intervention will be 
most likely for firms that are publicly perceived as poor performers. Given the anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that activists use the media to spread their message and garner 
support for their campaigns, I posit that activists may target firms with high level of 
coverage to increase the likelihood that their campaign receives coverage. I find 
consistent evidence that pre-intervention press coverage is positively related to the 
likelihood and the level of press coverage of an activist campaign announcement. 
Finally, I find evidence of one benefit that higher media coverage conveys to activists 
who are successful in gaining coverage of their campaign announcements, namely, 
higher announcement returns that do not subsequently reverse.  
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Future research can examine the longer-term implications of media coverage for 
activist campaigns. For example, do campaigns that gain greater media exposure enjoy 
higher returns or greater likelihood of success? What is the relation between media 
coverage and management disclosure? Are they complements or substitutes? How does 
management disclosure behavior change in the face of negative media coverage? What 
sort of consequences do executives face for negative media coverage? As discussed in 
Miller and Skinner (2016), while some research on the media has occurred, the area is 
still relatively undeveloped and ripe for future exploration. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
These two essays examine important antecedents and outcomes of shareholder 
activism campaigns. The first essay examines how investors and other informed capital 
market participants respond to shareholder activism campaigns. Consistent with prior 
literature, we document positive and significant short-window abnormal returns to 
activist interventions, and we find no evidence that the returns reverse over the long-
term. Using a broad measure of fundamentals, we show that target firms experience 
operational improvements in the years following an activist intervention. The essay’s 
primary contribution, however, is to show how informed market participants respond to 
activism campaigns. We find that analyst recommendations improve, short selling 
declines, and long-term institutional ownership increases after an activist intervention. 
These bullish responses provide strong and consistent evidence that activist campaigns 
improve the prospects of target firms, especially because they occur after—and 
despite—a significant and persistent increase in target-firm stock prices around the 
activism campaign announcement. 
In the second essay, I examine the role of the business press in activist 
interventions. I document four important results: First, consistent with theory that 
predicts greater likelihood of intervention at firms that are well-understood and highly 
visible to investors (Kahn and Winton 1998), I find that both the level of business press 
coverage and the breadth of coverage increase the likelihood of being targeted by an 
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activist investor. Second, consistent with prior theory that predicts a greater likelihood of 
intervention at firms that are poorly perceived by the public (Kahn and Winton 1998), I 
find that the relation between press coverage and the likelihood of intervention is 
strongest for negative media coverage. Third, I find a positive relation between the level 
of pre-intervention press coverage at a targeted firm and the likelihood that an activist 
campaign receives press coverage on the campaign announcement day. This result is 
consistent with activists’ well known desire to use the media to publicize and garner 
public support for their campaign objectives. Finally, I document an economic benefit 
that activists receive when their campaign announcements receive press coverage, 
namely, larger initial announcement returns. Taken together, the findings in these essays 
inform the debate on the value of shareholder activism and the role that the business 
press plays in influencing the likelihood of and market reaction to an activist 
intervention.  
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Panel A. Dependent Variables 
Activist An indicator equal to 1 for observations representing firms 
targeted by an activist investor and equal to 0 for control firms 
CAR_Evt2 The cumulative abnormal return over the campaign 
announcement date, t = 0, and day t+1. Abnormal returns for 
each day are calculated as the firm’s raw return less the value-
weighted market return 
FScore See Appendix B 
Meanrec Average monthly recommendation level ranging from 1 to 5, 
where 1 = strong sell, 2 = sell, 3 = hold, 4 = buy, and 5 = 
strong buy 
News_Cover An indicator equal to 1 for activist campaigns that receive 
press coverage on the day of the campaign announcement. 
Campaigns are designated as receiving coverage if the count 
of articles on the day of the announcement is greater than the 
average daily count for days [-30, -1] relative to the 
announcement date 
N_Articles_Annc The number of articles on the activist campaign announcement 
date 
Own_Ded The number of shares owned by dedicated institutional 
investors at calendar quarter-end, scaled by shares outstanding 
Own_Tran The number of shares owned by transient institutional 
investors at calendar quarter-end, scaled by shares outstanding 
Shortint Monthly short interest from Compustat, computed as the 
number of shares sold short as of the settlement date, scaled by 
shares outstanding 
 
Panel B. Independent Variables 
Activism Demand 
Categories 
See Appendix B 
Activist An indicator equal to 1 for observations representing firms 
targeted by an activist investor and equal to 0 for control firms 
Analyst A count of the number of analysts who made either an annual 
or a quarterly forecast for the firm during the fiscal year 
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Av_ESS The average level of ESS for all articles over the fiscal year. 
Av_ESS_No50 The average level of ESS for all articles, excluding non-
neutral (i.e., ESS = 50) over the fiscal year 
BHAR 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal return in excess of the 
value-weighted market return, measured over the fiscal year 
Buypct Monthly number of buy recommendations, divided by total 
recommendations and multiplied by 100 
Div_Yield The sum of common and preferred dividends, divided by the 
sum of the market value of common stock plus the book value 
of preferred stock 
Evttime A discrete variable ranging from -24 to 24, denoting the month 
of observation relative to the activism announcement 
Growth Current year sales divided by lagged sales, less one 
Holdpct Monthly number of hold recommendations, divided by total 
recommendations and multiplied by 100 
Inst Average institutional ownership over the four quarters during 
the fiscal year (Equations 5 and D1) or institutional ownership 
as of the quarter-end that most closely precedes the activist 
campaign announcement (Equations 6 and 7) 
Lev Long-term debt-to-assets ratio at the end of the fiscal year 
Liquidity The yearly average, using daily data, of 
 −1 ∗ 1000√
|𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛|
𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
  
LSize Natural log of market value of equity for the company at the 
end of the fiscal year (Equations 5 and D1) or at the end of the 
fiscal-quarter most closely preceding the campaign 
announcement date (Equations 6 and 7). 
N_Articles The total number of articles over the fiscal year 
N_Articles_No50 The total number of articles over the fiscal year, excluding 
those that are classified as being neutral in sentiment (ESS = 
50) 
N_Articles_PMonth The total number of articles over days [-31, -2] relative to the 
campaign announcement date, t = 0 
N_Neg The total number of negative articles (i.e., ESS < 50) over the 
fiscal year 
N_Pos The total number of positive articles (i.e., ESS > 50) over the 
fiscal year.  
N_Sources The number of unique sources providing coverage of the firm 
during the fiscal year. Because the Dow Jones edition of the 
RavenPack database includes press coverage for four media 
outlets (by the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, MarketWatch, 
and Dow Jones Newswires), N_Sources ranges from 0 to 4 
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N_Sources_Annc The number of unique sources providing coverage of the firm 
on the campaign announcement date 
N_Sources_PMonth The number of unique sources providing coverage of the firm 
over days [-31, -2] relative to the campaign announcement 
date, t = 0 
N_VeryNeg The total number of very negative articles (i.e., ESS < 25) 
over the fiscal year 
N_VeryPos The total number of very positive articles (i.e., ESS > 75) over 
the fiscal year 
Prominent An indicator equal to 1 for campaigns launched by an activist 
that is classified as prominent by either SharkRepellant (i.e., 
whether the activist is a member of the “SharkWatch 50”) or 
Thomson One (i.e., whether the activist is included in the 
“Prominent Activist” search option) 
ROA EBITDA divided by lagged assets 
Sale An indicator equal to 1 for activist campaigns that seek to sell 
the company or a part of it; 0 otherwise 
Sellpct Monthly number of sell recommendations, divided by total 
recommendations and multiplied by 100 
SP1500 An indicator equal to 1 for activist targets that are part of the 
S&P Composite 1500 at the time of the campaign 
announcement 
Year An indicator equal to 1 for the fiscal year indicated by the 
subscript, relative to year of the activism announcement (t) 
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APPENDIX B 
CONSTRUCTION OF FSCORE COMPONENTS 
 
 Variable Calculation with Compustat Names FVARi = 1 if… 
Profitability 
ROAt 
𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑡−1
 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 > 0 
ΔROAt 
𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑡−1
−
𝐼𝐵𝑡−1
𝐴𝑇𝑡−2
 𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 > 0 
CFOt 
𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑡−1
 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 > 0 
ACCRUALt 
𝐼𝐵𝑡 − 𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑡−1
 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑡 < 0 
Capital 
Structure 
ΔLEVERt 
𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑡 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑡
[
𝐴𝑇𝑡 + 𝐴𝑇𝑡−1
2 ]
−
𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑡−1
[
𝐴𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝑇𝑡−2
2 ]
 𝛥𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡 < 0 
ΔLIQUIDt 
𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑡
𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑡
−
𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑡−1
𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑡−1
 𝛥𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷 > 0 
EQ_OFFERt 
= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑇𝐾𝐶𝑡 > 𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐾𝐶𝐶𝑡 
or 
DISTCD=658X in CRSP’s DSEALL 
during year t 
EQ_OFFERt = 0 
Operating 
Efficiency 
ΔMARGINt 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡 − 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡
−
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 − 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡−1
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡−1
 
𝛥𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑡 > 0 
ΔTURNt 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑡−1
−
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡−1
𝐴𝑇𝑡−2
 𝛥𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 > 0 
FScore signals include ROA, change in ROA, cash flow from operations, accruals, change in 
leverage, change in liquidity, seasoned equity offering indicator, change in gross margin, and 
change in sales turnover. Each signal is classified as either good or bad and given a score of 1 
or 0, respectively. The FScore is simply the sum of the nine scores.  
Compustat Variable Descriptions: ACT: Current Assets – Total, AT: Assets – Total, COGS: 
Cost of Goods Sold, DLC: Debt in Current Liabilities – Total, DLTT: Long-Term Debt – 
Total, IB: Income before Extraordinary Items, LCT: Current Liabilities – Total, OANCF: 
Operating Activities Net Cash Flow, PRSTKCC: Purchase of Common Stock (Cash Flow), 
SALE: Sales/Turnover (Net), SCSTKC: Sale of Common Stock (Cash Flow).  
See Piotroski (2000) for the motivation of each component. 
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APPENDIX C 
CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIVISM EVENTS 
 
Initial Demand  Description 
Sale  The activist’s goal is for management to put the company, or 
a part of the company, up for sale. Activist campaigns in this 
category include events in which the proposed buyer, if 
identified, may either be a third party or the activist itself.  
Engage 
management 
 The activist announces its intention to communicate with 
management to discuss ways to “enhance shareholder value” 
but does not include any specific plans or proposals in its 
announcement.  
Board composition  The activist seeks to change the board composition in some 
way, for example, by withholding its vote for certain 
directors, by requesting that one or more of the existing 
directors step down, and/or by demanding that its own 
nominee(s) be elected to the board. 
Corporate 
governance 
 The activist pushes for changes that are related to corporate 
governance but are not related to board composition. 
Examples include demands for increased transparency, the 
resignation of one or more managers, the elimination of a 
poison pill, and/or the declassification of the board.  
Corporate strategy  This type of activism includes campaigns aimed at changing 
some aspect of the company’s strategy, for example, by 
spinning off a division, opposing a proposed sale, adopting a 
more tax-efficient capital structure, or focusing on a 
narrower range of products. 
Other  This category includes activist interventions that do not fall 
into the categories above, for example, supporting a 
dissident group in a proxy fight, supporting management in a 
proxy fight, proposing liquidation or reorganization, or 
voting for third-party stockholder proposal. 
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APPENDIX D 
DESCRIPTION OF PROPENSITY-SCORE MATCHING METHODOLOGY 
 
Propensity-Score Matching Model 
To identify a sample of control firms with characteristics similar to the target firms, we 
use logistic regression to predict shareholder activism in year t (firm subscripts omitted for 
clarity). The regression uses all firms with available data in year t-1. 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑣_𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 
+𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑄 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸 
(D1) 
All of the independent variables above have been shown in prior studies to be determinants of 
the activist’s targeting decision (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 2008; Chen and Jung 
2015; Aslan and Kumar 2016; Gantchev and Jotikasthira 2017). LSize represents firm i’s log of 
the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. Activists are more likely to target smaller 
firms because establishing a large enough ownership stake to exert influence is less costly. 
BHAR measures the buy-and-hold abnormal return (firm i’s return less the value-weighted 
market return) over fiscal year t-1. We match on prior stock performance because one of critics’ 
key arguments is that activists target firms after a decline in stock price and any improvement in 
their market return observed after the activist intervention would have occurred anyway. Lev is 
firm i’s debt at the end of year t-1, scaled by assets at that time. Activists often target firms they 
perceive as under-levered in order to push the company to increase its debt. Div_Yield is firm i’s 
dividend yield in year t-1: (preferred dividends + common dividends)/(market value of common 
stock + book value of preferred stock). Div_Yield is included to capture activists’ commonly 
observed demand to increase shareholder payouts at firms with low payouts. ROA is earnings 
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before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, scaled by beginning-of-year assets (i.e., 
assets at the end of year t-2). Growth is firm i’s sales growth from year t-2 to year t-1. Prior 
research has found that targets tend to exhibit lower sales growth but higher profitability.  
Analyst represents analyst following and is defined as the number of analysts who make 
either a quarterly or an annual earnings forecast during fiscal year t-1. Inst denotes average 
institutional ownership across the four quarters during the fiscal year t-1. Kahn and Winton 
(1998) argue that activists will only intervene in target firms to improve firm performance (1) if 
they understand the target’s industry and (2) if the market understands the target’s industry, so 
that it can quickly ascertain the benefits of the intervention. Thus, activists are more likely to 
target firms that have a more transparent information environment (proxied by higher analyst 
following) and more sophisticated shareholders (proxied by higher institutional ownership). Both 
Analyst and Inst are set to 0 when missing.  
We include a proxy for trading liquidity, Liquidity, modified from Amihud (2002) and 
calculated as the yearly average of the following daily measure: 
−1 ∗ 1000√
|𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛|
𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
 
The original Amihud (2002) measures illiquidity, so we multiply it by -1 so that higher values 
reflect higher trading liquidity. We multiply it by 1000 to reduce the number of zeros to the right 
of the decimal point. We include Liquidity as a determinant of activism because prior literature 
shows that activists are more likely to intervene at companies with substantial trading volume, 
since this lowers the costs of entering and exiting an activist position (Edman, Fang, Zur 2013; 
Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele 2015; Gantchev and Jotikasthira 2017). We include TobinsQ, 
the ratio of the market value of a firm’s assets divided by the replacement value of the firm’s 
assets, to control for the fact that activists tend to target firms that are undervalued. Finally, we 
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include year fixed effects and Fama-French, 17-industry fixed effects to control for 
macroeconomic drivers of activism.22 
Propensity-Score Matching Results 
 Results from our model predicting the likelihood of an activist intervention (Equation 
D1) are found at the end of Appendix D in Table D1, Panel A. In column one, we present results 
from an earlier version of the paper that omits TobinsQ from the model. Based on presentation 
feedback, we include TobinsQ in the model used to generate the matched sample used in our 
main analyses (column two). We note that the addition of TobinsQ to the model causes BHAR 
and ROA to lose significance; nevertheless, our main results are virtually identical whether we 
use the model in column one or in column two to generate the matched sample. Overall, we find 
that targets have lower pre-intervention returns than control firms. We also find that targeted 
firms tend to be smaller, and they have more debt, higher return-on-assets, lower sales growth, 
greater coverage by analysts, higher institutional ownership, greater liquidity, and lower values 
of TobinsQ. The significant characteristics are similar to those in other recent studies. For 
example, for the period from 2000 to 2007, Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2017) find that targeting 
is positively correlated with liquidity and institutional ownership, and negatively correlated with 
size and Tobin’s Q. The area under the ROC curve is 0.8, so the model is much better than 
random assignment in discriminating between targets and non-targets.  
Using the predicted values (i.e., propensity scores) from the above regression, we match 
(without replacement) each target firm to the non-target firm with the same fiscal year-end and 
                                                 
22 Recent research documents spillover effects of shareholder activism to non-targeted industry peers (e.g., 
Aslan and Kumar 2016; Gantchev, Gredil, and Jotikasthira 2016). We match target firms to control firms 
from the same industry, so to the extent that the activism campaigns elicit similar capital market responses 
at non-targeted peer firms, we should not observe significant post-intervention differences between target 
and control firms. Spillover effects therefore reduce the likelihood of rejecting our null hypotheses.  
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Fama-French 17 industry that has the closest propensity score (i.e., the “nearest neighbor”). We 
require that the difference in propensities between a target firm and its match be no larger than 
0.006, which is based on the rule-of-thumb of 0.2 times the standard deviation of propensity 
scores, as suggested by Austin (2011). The reported results include only target firms for which 
we found suitable matches. 23 In Panel B, we report on covariate balance and find that the 
differences between the target and control firms are all statistically insignificant (regardless of 
whether TobinsQ is included in the model), suggesting that activist and control firms are 
comparable along these observable determinants of activism. Thus, the control firms provide a 
reasonable proxy for the counterfactual of the targeted firms without the intervention.24   
  
                                                 
23 The number of suitable matches found is virtually identical if we use a more relaxed caliper of 0.1. We 
also find that including the unmatched target firms produces results that are nearly identical.  
24 The ideal test of the effects of activism would assign firms to activists randomly to see if activism has a 
positive effect. Since this ideal is not possible, we match targeted firms with control firms on observable 
characteristics and make the reasonable assumption that unobservable characteristics are not associated 
with those that are observable (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 2014).  
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TABLE D1. Likelihood of Being Targeted by an Activist Investor 
Panel A: Propensity Score Estimation (based on logistic regression) 
 (1) (2) 
Dep. Variable = Activist 
Coefficient  
(Standard Error) 
LSizet-1 -0.213*** -0.195*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0213) 
BHARt-1 -0.175*** -0.0662 
 (0.0407) (0.0443) 
Levt-1 0.121*** 0.175** 
 (0.0454) (0.0748) 
Div_Yieldt-1 -0.760 -0.963 
 (0.792) (0.810) 
ROAt-1 0.300*** 0.175 
 (0.100) (0.119) 
Growtht-1 -0.166*** -0.123*** 
 (0.0475) (0.0445) 
Analystt-1 0.0145*** 0.0163*** 
 (0.00431) (0.00429) 
Instt-1 1.166*** 1.116*** 
 (0.0865) (0.0851) 
Liquidityt-1 0.139*** 0.153*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0376) 
TobinsQt-1  -0.201*** 
  (0.0434) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects (Fama-French 
17) 
YES 
YES 
N 117,924 117,872 
Pseudo R-squared 0.14 0.14 
Area under the ROC Curve 0.80 0.81 
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively, with two-tailed p-values, calculated based on standard errors clustered at 
the firm-level. 
 
Appendix A provides variable definitions. 
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Panel B: Covariate Balance for Target and Control Firms 
 Subsample Means (excl. TobinsQ)  Subsample Means (incl. TobinsQ) 
Variable Target Control diff. p > |t|  Target Control diff. p > |t| 
LSize 5.844 5.828 0.755  5.844 5.822 0.668 
BHAR -0.040 -0.031 0.450  -0.040 -0.040 0.957 
Lev 0.555 0.554 0.918  0.555 0.547 0.292 
Div_Yield 0.012 0.013 0.617  0.012 0.012 0.510 
ROA 0.073 0.067 0.320  0.073 0.070 0.612 
Growth 0.117 0.117 0.991  0.117 0.117 0.990 
Analyst 8.269 8.088 0.428  8.269 8.179 0.697 
Inst 0.527 0.522 0.527  0.527 0.522 0.518 
Liquidity -0.402 -0.397 0.803  -0.402 -0.402 0.977 
TobinsQ     1.596 1.608 0.763 
Number of Matched 
Activist Target-
Years 3,244    3,244   
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the covariates used to predict the likelihood of being targeted by an activist 
investor. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  
Appendix A provides variable definitions. 
 
 
